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CLUSTERED BIAS*
KATE SABLOSKY ELENGOLD**
Agencies, advocates, and courts regularly and repeatedly fail
plaintiffs who have experienced intersectional discrimination
based on more than one personal identity trait. Nearly thirty
years after intersectionality theory was first introduced to legal
scholarship, however, its insights have yet to be effectively
integrated into antidiscrimination advocacy and doctrine. This
Article borrows the contributions of intersectionality theory and
explores its critiques to develop a novel “cluster framework” for
bridging the divide between the theory and civil rights
jurisprudence. Using race-sex discrimination as a lens, the
proposed framework relocates intersectional discrimination
wholly within a traditionally protected class, illuminating
similarities and differences in discrimination across groups and
subgroups. This Article concludes with three concrete proposals
to implement the cluster framework such that the
antidiscrimination doctrine will better recognize and remedy
intersectional discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Tametra Moore sued Cricket Communications, Inc. for
sexual harassment, racial harassment, and retaliation in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in employment.1 Tametra is an African American2
woman.3 She worked in sales at retail Cricket stores in Tennessee and
Texas.4 In 2008, two years into her employment with Cricket,
Tametra was subjected to sexual and racial harassment at the hands

1. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 7–11, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Moore Compl.]. The assertions
related to Tametra Moore set forth in this Introduction and throughout this Article are
drawn from publicly-available documents in the federal lawsuit and include Ms. Moore’s
allegations as stated in her complaint and her deposition. Except where specifically noted,
the information asserted herein was not decided as a matter of fact or law by a court.
Tametra Moore’s case, however, illuminates the failures of advocacy, agencies, and
antidiscrimination law to consider and remedy intersectional discrimination regardless of
whether each individual allegation was, or could have been, proven.
2. For reasons I set forth in an earlier work, and keeping with the trend of omitting
hyphens when using terms that combine ethnicities or nationalities, I employ the term
“African American” without a hyphen. I also choose to capitalize the terms “Black” and
“White” unless they appear in a quotation. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity,
93 DENV. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (2015).
3. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 2.
4. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B at
17:11-18:13, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010),
ECF No. 25-2 [hereinafter Moore Dep.].
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of her store manager, Travis.5 Travis repeatedly made sexually
explicit comments to Tametra in the workplace, discussing his sexual
prowess and his penis, and stating that he “likes to eat from the ass to
the pussy.”6 Travis’s sexual vulgarity was connected, in large part, to
race. Travis asked Tametra if she had “ever been with a white man”
and told her: “It’s a myth that white man’s have little dicks, because
my dick is huge.”7 Travis spoke of Black women in sexual and
derogatory ways, asserting “the blacker the berry, the sweeter the
juice” and “Black women got better pussy than white women.”8
Travis showed Tametra and her colleague, Dwan (also a Black
woman9), a naked photograph of himself and invited them to send
him naked pictures of themselves.10 Tametra found Travis’s language
and behavior to be vulgar11 and filed a complaint with his superiors.12
In spite of a Cricket supervisor’s stated belief that Travis would not
have made those comments to White women,13 Cricket
Communications failed to take Tametra’s claims seriously.14 Tametra
hired a lawyer, filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), received a right-to-sue letter,
and filed suit against Cricket Communications in federal district
court.15 She asserted three claims: sexual harassment, racial
harassment, and retaliation.16 After a significant period of discovery
and motion practice, Tametra endured a four-day trial.17 Having
received jury instructions and a jury questionnaire explicitly and
unambiguously separating Tametra’s sexual harassment and racial

5. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 1–3.
6. Moore Dep., supra note 4, at 155:18–156:25.
7. Id. at 158:2–9.
8. Id. at 248:6–25.
9. Id. at 74:14–17.
10. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit A at
10–11, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF
No. 25-1 [hereinafter Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire]; Moore Compl., supra note 1,
at 3.
11. Moore Dep., supra note 4, at 157:9–11.
12. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4.
13. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C at
25:17–23, Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010),
ECF No. 25-3; Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4.
14. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 4–6.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 7–11.
17. See Transcript of Trial Day 4 of 4 at 1, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 67.
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harassment claims,18 the jury found for the defendant, Cricket
Communications, Inc., on all claims.19
Tametra’s story is not atypical. Approximately one in five Black
women report sex discrimination (including sexual harassment) in the
workplace.20 Black women also report racialized sexual harassment in
housing, where their experiences of sexual harassment are infused
with racial animus.21 Those stories of intersectional discrimination—
discrimination based on more than one identity trait—are replicated,
with different identity characteristics and in different venues—
employment, education, and public accommodations—around the
country. And yet, Tametra is not alone in her failure to find remedy
under the current antidiscrimination laws. Tametra, like other women
of color, was failed by courts, by advocates, and by the federal agency
tasked with implementing the relevant antidiscrimination statute.
Each of those entities approached Tametra’s injury, and thus her
identity, in separate silos, assessing her claim of race discrimination as
isolated from her claim of sex discrimination in the form of sexual
harassment. In doing so, each relevant, institutional player ignored
the ways in which intersectional discrimination, like that experienced
by Tametra, operates in the real world.
Scholars, including critical race scholars, predicted and detailed
the failures of courts, advocates, and agencies to fully implement
antidiscrimination law for plaintiffs who have identities that cross
protected classes. Intersectionality theory, introduced to legal
18. Jury Instructions at 4–6, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 59 [hereinafter Moore Jury Instructions]; Jury
Questions at 1–2, Moore v. Cricket Commn’cs, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7,
2011), ECF No. 63 [hereinafter Moore Jury Questions].
19. Moore Jury Questions, supra note 19, at 1–3.
20. PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON PAY GAP, MILLENNIAL WOMEN NEAR PARITY - FOR
NOW: DESPITE GAINS, MANY SEE ROADBLOCKS AHEAD, 50 (2013),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/12/gender-and-work_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7E9R-WD54]. Roughly the same percentage of White women report sex discrimination in
employment. Id. Sexual harassment is a subset of sex discrimination. See Joshua F.
Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1361, 1362 (stating that gender discrimination laws protect employees from employers
who “demand[] sexual favors as a condition of employment . . . .”).
21. See Griff Tester, An Intersectional Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 22
GENDER & SOC’Y 349, 353, 355 (2008) (finding that African American women accounted
for fifty-eight percent of the verified claims of sexual harassment filed with the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission alleging violations of fair housing laws between 1990 and 2003); see
also Kate Sablosky Elengold, Structural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual
Harassment in Housing, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 237–42 (2016) (cataloguing
affidavit, deposition, and trial testimony of women experiencing racialized sexual
harassment in sex-based discrimination claims brought by the Attorney General of the
United States under the federal Fair Housing Act).
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academics by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, seeks to explain and
analyze the experience of individuals with more than one traditionally
subordinated personal identity trait: “intersectionality.”22 As applied
to Tametra’s case, the discrimination she experienced was
intersectional in that it related both to her race (Black-ness)23 and her
sex (female-ness). In that way, Tametra’s experience of intersectional
discrimination is different from single-axis discrimination based only
on one protected category. Crenshaw explains that a Black woman’s
experience of bias and discrimination is different from a Black man’s
experience and different from a White woman’s experience.24 Nor is a
Black woman’s experience of discrimination an additive experience; it
is not race discrimination like that experienced by a Black man plus
sex discrimination like that experienced by a White woman.25
Some scholars have also challenged the wisdom of relying on
rights-based antidiscrimination law for equality advancement, arguing
that such laws were neither drafted nor developed to accommodate
complex plaintiffs and criticizing the laws for ignoring the actual

22. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex; A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140.
23. It is worth noting that Tametra could also have proceeded on a colorism
complaint or on an allegation that the discrimination was based on color. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2012). The relationship between race and color protections in antidiscrimination
law is complicated, murky, and outside the scope of this Article. For further reading on the
topic, see, Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1705, 1743 (2000); Elengold, supra note 2, at 23–26; Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing:
Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 657, 677 (2010).
24. Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467, 1467–68 (1992) (“African-American women by virtue of our race and gender are
situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and sexism. This dual
vulnerability does not simply mean that our burdens are doubled but instead, that the
dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are
sometimes unique to us.”).
25. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991); Crenshaw,
supra note 22, at 140. Intersectionality theory is complemented by the work of antiessentialist scholars, who push back against the notion that there is a single shared
experience for any group or subgroup of individuals. Some anti-essentialism scholars have
critiqued feminist and anti-racist movements for failing to account for the particular and
unique experiences of women of color; see also Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of
Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (1997); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism,
Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 620 (2013) (citing ELIZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT, at
ix (1988)); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
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needs of subordinated groups in favor of isolated legal rights.26 These
scholars have done important work to raise our collective
consciousness about the experiences of women of color and others
with intersectional identities facing bias and discrimination.
Intersectionality theory has not, however, been immune from
critique. Scholars inside and outside of the legal academy have
complained that intersectionality theory is both under inclusive and
over inclusive.27 Intersectionality theory has been critiqued as under
inclusive, or reductionist, because it focuses on the unique and
incomparable situation of certain intersectional identities to the
exclusion of others. Intersectionality theory has also been deemed
over inclusive because each individual is comprised of an infinite
number of identity traits, crossing an infinite number of axes. Thus,
critics contend, there are no logical boundaries or study groups. Both
the under inclusive and over inclusive critiques are barriers to the
theory’s application to antidiscrimination law and doctrine. As such,
they represent certain limitations of intersectionality theory to permit
or encourage understanding and analogizing discrimination across
groups and subgroups. They also predict, at least in part, courts’
general rejection of intersectional discrimination in civil rights
actions.
This Article proposes a bridge between intersectionality theory
and civil rights jurisprudence. Borrowing the insights of
intersectionality and post-intersectionality theories, which have
continued to evolve Crenshaw’s original theory and account for some
of its critiques,28 this Article develops a novel framework to present,
analyze, and remedy intersectional discrimination within the current
civil rights doctrine. Using race-sex discrimination as the lens, this
Article proposes relocating that form of intersectional discrimination
26. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 53, 95–96 (1999) (critiquing the rights-based civil rights model because of its
suggestion that it was developed through the lens of a White experience and fails to
achieve critical needs for subordinated groups, including social and economic justice);
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984) (critiquing
rights-based theory for impeding progressive advances). But see Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356–58 (1988) (acknowledging that the
civil rights statutes have both been transformative and risk re-legitimizing institutional
structures that have historically subordinated Blacks); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,
402–05 (1987) (critiquing Critical Legal Studies scholarship’s rejection of rights-based civil
rights).
27. See infra notes 94–105 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text.
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wholly within sex discrimination.29 Relocating the analysis will not
only preclude the institutional players—the agencies, advocates, and
courts—from separating and siloing strands of victims’ identities, but
will also allow scholars and advocates to see connections between
different subgroup discrimination and overcome the barriers for
intersectional plaintiffs asserting civil rights violations.
Part I of this Article sets out the problem—the insights of
intersectionality theory have failed to take root in civil rights
advocacy and jurisprudence. Part I exposes failures in three specific
arenas: antidiscrimination jurisprudence, advocacy, and agencies. Part
II details the primary limits of intersectionality theory in application
to antidiscrimination law. It draws the connection between those
limits and the failures of antidiscrimination doctrine to adequately
account for intersectional plaintiffs and intersectional discrimination.
Part III applies the insights derived from intersectionality and postintersectionality theories to propose a novel framework for seeking to
remedy intersectional discrimination through antidiscrimination law.
Part III proposes (1) reimagining intersectional discrimination
through an image of coterminous, rather than overlapping, circles of
protected class identity; (2) relocating intersectional discrimination
within those coterminous circles and thus, squarely within the
definition of any one of the relevant categories of prohibited
discrimination; (3) explicitly defining discrimination to include the
categorizing, stereotyping, and subjugation of certain subgroups of
protected classes, thus accounting for the relationship between
individual discrimination and structural inequities;30 and (4)
recognizing the full range of harms that flow from complex
discrimination—to the individual, her community, her subgroup and
her group. Part III uses race-sex discrimination as the lens to further
flesh out the components of the cluster framework. Part IV concludes
with recommendations for implementing the cluster framework in the
context of the antidiscrimination doctrine. Returning to Tametra’s
story, Part IV offers three concrete proposals for implementation of
the cluster framework in the same arenas that have failed
intersectional plaintiffs—advocacy, agencies, and courts. Although
29. For the sake of clarity, this Article frames intersectional discrimination through
the lens of discrimination against women of color, specifically Black women. The insights
in this Article, however, can easily be applied to intersectional identity outside of race-sex
intersectionality.
30. This Article defines “structural inequities” as inequities based not on individual
actions or biases, but inequities that arise from the social, cultural, and legal systems that
were built on and perpetuate unfair, discriminatory, or disproportionate results for certain
subgroups. For a more complete analysis, see infra Section III.B.
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the proposals do not perfectly mirror the failures identified in Part I,
they aim to make inroads toward fixing them.
The idea that “women’s rights are human rights”31 has taken hold
nationally and internationally; it is only natural that women of color’s
rights are clearly identified as both women’s rights and human rights.
Utilizing the cluster framework, we can reimagine the way that
current civil rights protections can be laboring oars in the fight for
racial and gender equality. And by implementing a new framework
for presenting, analyzing, and remedying intersectional discrimination
in civil rights cases, one can identify and utilize analogies between and
across subgroup discrimination.
I. THE FAILURES OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW TO ADDRESS
INTERSECTIONAL BIAS
The failure of antidiscrimination law to adequately address or
remedy intersectional discrimination is well explored in the academic
literature. Scholars have shown, in both quantitative and qualitative
terms, that the current civil rights jurisprudence does not adequately
account for intersectional plaintiffs or intersectional discrimination.
In 1994, for example, Kathryn Abrams detailed courts’ rejection of
and hesitancy about intersectional claims asserted in civil rights
actions.32 Tracing Title VII case law, Abrams explored the failure of
the jurisprudence to recognize and remedy complex bias in sex
discrimination claims, including claims of sexual harassment.33
Neither the passage of time nor the further development of
intersectionality theory and its progeny34 have changed the results in
the courtroom.35 Empirical work provides additional support for the

31. Hillary Rodham Clinton, First Lady of U.S., Remarks to the U.N. 4th World
Conference on Women Plenary Session (Sept. 5, 1995) (transcript available at
http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950905175653.txt [https://perma.cc
/WX6P-AF9W]).
32. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479, 2494–2517 (1994).
33. Id. at 2498. Abrams uses the term “complex claimant” to include “persons
claiming intersectional forms of discrimination, or manifesting identities that are
ambivalent in relation to the existing statutory categories . . . .” Id. at 2481.
34. See infra Part II.
35. Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 713, 730 (2015) (“Twenty years later, judicial opinions containing thoughtful analysis
of intersectional claims remain few and far between; legal theory and scholarship on
intersectionality continue to vastly outpace actual Title VII doctrine. . . . There is no robust
canon of intersectionality case law.” (footnote omitted)).
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disconnect between intersectionality theory and civil rights doctrine.36
A 2011 interdisciplinary study of employment discrimination actions,
for example, concluded that the existence of demographic and/or
claim intersectionality “dramatically reduce[s the] odds of plaintiff
victory.”37 In other words, plaintiffs exhibiting identification with
more than one traditionally subordinated group (“demographic
intersectionality,”38 also known as a “complex claimant”39 or an
“intersectional”40) and/or plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the
basis
of
overlapping
ascriptive
characteristics
(“claim
intersectionality”41 or “intersectional discrimination”42) are less
successful in employment discrimination actions.43
That failure can be ascribed, in part, to courts, advocates, and
agencies, all of whom have neglected intersectional plaintiffs by
failing to recognize, advocate for, and remedy intersectional
discrimination. This Part details the primary failures of each of those
institutions with respect to understanding and remedying
intersectional discrimination. It highlights how courts have allowed
the structure of antidiscrimination law to limit remedies for
intersectional discrimination, how advocates have reinforced the
separation of protected classes with a continued use of stock stories,
and how agencies’ reliance on standard forms limits allegations and
prosecution of complex discrimination. The failures of each
institution are inseparable as to cause and effect; like the chicken and
egg, the failures in one reinforce and perpetuate the failures in the
others.
A. Courts: The Failure of the Siloed Claims
Why is it that courts are unwilling to address or remedy complex
discrimination? The answer, much like discrimination itself, is
36. See Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 994–97 (2011);
Emma Reece Denny, Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 340 (2012); Mayeri, supra
note 35 at 714.
37. Best et al., supra note 36, at 1013.
38. Id. at 991.
39. Abrams, supra note 32, at 2503.
40. Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality As “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance
Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2006)
(defining “intersectionals” as “persons who are members of more than one ‘low-status’
category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”).
41. Best et al., supra note 36, at 991.
42. Abrams, supra note 32, at 2494.
43. Best et al., supra note 36, at 991.
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complicated. The most obvious roadblock to remedying intersectional
discrimination is the way that Congress designed and wrote the
antidiscrimination statutes. Antidiscrimination law is designed around
the protection of certain “protected classes.”44 To make out a
cognizable disparate treatment claim under an antidiscrimination
statute, a plaintiff must identify her protected class (e.g., race) and
sub-class (e.g., African American), upon which she believes her
adverse treatment was based.45 Because of the statutory design, for
much of civil rights analysis, courts look to similarly-situated
individuals as a kind of control group to evaluate whether the
plaintiff’s adverse treatment can be tagged to her protected class
status.46 The structure of the protected class categorization fails
intersectional plaintiffs because it sets up false and defeating control
groups, creates an unnecessary “but for” test for civil rights plaintiffs,
and is vulnerable to a slippery slope critique.
A plaintiff alleging that she was not hired in violation of Title
VII, for example, must prove her case under either the McDonnell
Douglas test47 or Price Waterhouse analysis.48 To make a prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish that (1)
she is a member of a protected class, (2) she applied for and was
qualified for the job, (3) she was not hired for the job, and (4) the job
either remained open or was filled with someone from outside her
protected sub-class.49 Once she makes her prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse treatment.50 Then, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s non-discriminatory reason is

44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); id. § 3604 (prohibiting
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability,
and national origin).
45. See Elengold, supra note 2, at 4. Although civil rights plaintiffs may also seek to
remedy disparate impact discrimination, this paper focuses on disparate, or differential,
treatment claims.
46. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995)) (recognizing that a
disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act “requires proof of ‘differential
treatment of similarly situated persons or groups’”); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d
34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (cataloguing cases where courts have analyzed Title VII claims of
discrimination by assessing whether the employer treated the plaintiff “less favorably than
a similarly situated employee outside his protected group”).
47. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
48. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989).
49. 411 U.S. at 802.
50. Id.
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pretext for discrimination.51 The Price Waterhouse analysis, as
amended for employment actions by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
permits an employee to demonstrate intentional discrimination where
her protected class status was a “motivating factor” in the adverse
employment action, even if other factors also came in to play.52
Both the McDonnell Douglas test and the Price Waterhouse
analysis fail intersectional plaintiffs because they silo the protected
classes, rely on false control group(s), and set up a false “but for”
analysis. Courts too often cabin claims by protected class. If, for
example, a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on her status as a
Black woman, in most cases, the factfinder would be asked to
consider evidence of race-based discrimination separate and apart
from sex-based discrimination. Tametra’s case is a clear example.
Although her complaint alleged race-sex intersectional discrimination
(i.e., “[t]he working environment at Cricket was replete with sexuallycharged statements and jokes, racially offensive terms, and
insensitivity toward Plaintiff as an African-American woman”),53
Tametra pled “Sexual Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964” separately from “Racial Discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”54 The jury instructions
similarly charged the factfinders to separately assess her race
discrimination and sex discrimination claims.55 And the jury
interrogatories clearly established the separate analysis. The jury
interrogatories asked first whether the plaintiff was sexually
harassed.56 The jury answered no.57 Then the jury interrogatories
asked whether the plaintiff was discriminated against because of her
race.58 Once again, the jury answered no.59 Nowhere was the jury even
permitted to consider whether Tametra was discriminated against

51. Id. at 804.
52. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (1989) (developing a “mixed-motive” test
for employment discrimination under Title VII and holding that once a plaintiff “shows
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid
a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not allowed gender to play such a role” (footnote omitted)); see also Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2012)).
53. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 3.
54. Id. at 7–9.
55. Moore Jury Instructions, supra note 18, at 4, 6.
56. Moore Jury Questions, supra note 18, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
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because she was a Black woman.60 That separation is replicated
throughout civil rights jurisprudence.61
In addition to cabining the evidence, the use of protected classes
to govern analysis of alleged discrimination sets up false comparison
control groups (“comparators”) to establish that the plaintiff’s
protected class identity or identities was the basis for the adverse
employment or housing decision. Other scholars have described this
phenomenon by identifying and challenging that White men have
become the comparator group for analyzing discrimination of a Black
woman.62 This Article views it through a related, but different lens of
siloed claims and cabined evidence. If a Black woman alleges race-sex
discrimination, then an employer preferencing a White woman can
stymie her sex discrimination claim or an employer preferencing a
Black man can stymie her race discrimination claim. In other words,
an employer can argue that he does not discriminate against women
by pointing to the White woman who did not experience adverse
treatment. He can similarly defeat the plaintiff’s race claim by
pointing to the Black man who advanced in the company. While other
theorists have focused on white-ness and male-ness as neutral
comparators—a critical point in understanding the failures of the
antidiscrimination doctrine—this Article’s analysis identifies the
fundamental methodological flaw in using McDonnell Douglas to
analyze antidiscrimination claims because it explicitly recognizes that
the siloing of the protected classes limits the chances of an
intersectional plaintiff’s success on two separate axes.

60. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 710–14 (2001) (detailing the failures of antidiscrimination statutes for
intersectional plaintiffs through the use of a complex hypothetical of a Black female
plaintiff).
61. See, e.g., Daniels v. Brooklyn Estates & Props. Realty, 413 F. App’x 399, 402 (2d
Cir. 2011) (alleging race and disability discrimination); Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P’ship, 7
F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (alleging disability discrimination and sexual
harassment); Thomas v. Pocono Mtn. Sch. Dist., No. 3:10-CV-1946, 2011 WL 2471532, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation);
Harmon v. Mattson, Nos. C8-99-132, Co-99-755, 1999 WL 1057236, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 23, 1999) (alleging race discrimination and sexual harassment).
62. See Denny, supra note 36, at 366 (“Most courts require that a comparator be
someone who shares none of the protected characteristics of the plaintiff, so that a Black,
female plaintiff would have to use a non-Black, male comparator to prove pretext.”); see
also Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491–92 (2009) (suggesting that claims by Black females have been
defeated by application of a White male comparator); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex
Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 934–35 (2014) (lamenting that there “was no one who
could serve as a comparator” for a gender-nonconforming lesbian woman).
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The separation also sets up a false “but for” analysis. Although
claims under Title VII should be excluded from a “but for” analysis
because courts have permitted “mixed motive” or “motivating factor”
claims under Price Waterhouse,63 factfinders may question the
plaintiff’s credibility if she asserts multiple rationales for the
employer’s adverse action. In fact, there is reason to believe that
factfinders harshly judge the credibility of one asserting multiple
claims of discrimination because it is seen as throwing everything
against the wall to see what sticks.64 This distrust of intersectional
claims is connected to the courts’ concern about an amorphous
slippery slope in intersectional discrimination claims that threatens to
overtake the civil rights protections.65
Although not the same kind of structural barrier as those
addressed above, it is also important to recognize the differential
doctrinal treatment for racial harassment and sexual harassment
claims. A plaintiff alleging sexual harassment has two potential claim
theories; a plaintiff alleging racial harassment has only one. In a
sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff may proceed under either or both
of two theories: quid pro quo or hostile environment.66 Quid pro quo
generally requires a showing that the perpetrator conditioned a
benefit or limitation (e.g., housing or employment) on a sexual
encounter.67 To prove a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must
establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
“alter the conditions of [the victim’s employment or housing] and
create an abusive . . . environment.”68 Although racial harassment is a

63. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989) (finding that a “mixed
motive” Title VII claim is cognizable). But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
176–77 (2009) (holding that age must be the “but for” cause of discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Gross has not (yet) been extended to the Fair
Housing Act. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 616 (2d Cir.
2016).
64. Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for
Dismissal, Summary Judgment, Empl. Discrimination Rep., BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 4,
2002), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBN07BG5GVG0 [https://perma.cc
/E4QX-9RV9] (quoting United States District Court Judge Ruben Castillo of the
Northern District of Illinois’ describing plaintiffs’ lawyers as “throwing a plate of spaghetti
at the wall to see what sticks”).
65. See discussion infra text accompanying note 103.
66. See Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (P-H) ¶15,472, 135, 136
(W.D. Ohio 1983), aff’d, 770 F.2d 167, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision).
67. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993).
68. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Honce, 1 F.3d
at 1090 (applying the “severe or pervasive” standard to the Fair Housing Act).
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cognizable claim under traditional civil rights laws,69 a racial
harassment plaintiff can proceed only under one claim—hostile
environment. A quid pro quo claim does not translate from sexual
harassment to racial harassment. A plaintiff alleging racial
harassment could not, for example, make out a case that the landlord
charged her less rent because she agreed to put up with racist rants on
a regular basis.70 Further, the “severe or pervasive” standard is a
difficult standard to achieve and many racial harassment claims have
been dismissed for failing to meet the strict standard, making it even
more difficult to make out a racial harassment claim.71 As a normative
matter, this differential doctrinal treatment suggests that situating a
race-sex discrimination claim in sex discrimination opens more
avenues to success than situating the same claim in race
discrimination.
B.

Advocacy: The Failure of the Stock Story

In part because of the doctrinal concerns detailed above, civil
rights advocates have regularly relied on stock stories to explain
discrimination in a simplistic, easy-to-understand manner.72 Stock
stories are narratives that advocates use to tell their clients’ stories,
often in a courtroom. Stock stories invoke standard tropes, themes,
and characters that are familiar to the listener and that “resonate with

69. See, e.g., Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir.
2002).
70. One could (and probably should) challenge the law’s development of such
different paths to success for sexual harassment and racial harassment. That, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
71. Several courts have found racially offensive conduct to not be sufficiently severe
or pervasive under Title VII. See, e.g., Woodland, 302 F.3d at 844; Jones v. Dallas Cty., 47
F. Supp. 3d 469, 484–85 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Romeo v. APS Healthcare Bethesda, Inc., 876
F. Supp. 2d 577, 594 (D. Md. 2012). The severe or pervasive standard is also difficult under
a sexual harassment theory. See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534–35
(7th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court’s grant of summary judgment to employer defendant
and affirming that inappropriate behavior toward a subordinate employee was insufficient
to rise to the level of severe and pervasive sexual harassment); Weiss v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Chi., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court’s ruling that
plaintiff’s allegations that her supervisor asked for dates, called her a “dumb blonde,”
placed “I love you” signs in her locker, placed his hand on her shoulder, and attempted to
kiss her were isolated incidents that did not rise to the level of an actionable claim for
hostile environment).
72. Advocates include those lawyers who represent civil rights plaintiffs and those
activists (lawyers and others) who support civil rights protections through programming
and policy work. This Article focuses primarily on lawyers representing victims of civil
rights violations, primarily through litigation.
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the values, beliefs and assumptions” of the audience.73 By relying on
familiar themes and characters, stock stories ring true with factfinders
because they seem consistent with how the factfinder understands the
world to work and thus appear credible.74 Sometimes, stock stories
draw on bias or cultural stereotypes to boil a legal claim down to the
simplest and most universally palatable story.75 Scholars, however,
have detailed how stock stories are insufficient to remedy certain
harms, especially those harms that are seemingly too complex.76
Antidiscrimination advocacy and doctrine have long been
influenced by stock stories.77 While there may be legitimate, strategic
reasons to utilize a stock story, including ethical obligations to achieve
the client’s goals,78 scholars have explored the dangers of stock stories
in venues like housing discrimination and employment discrimination.
For example, the “dirty old man” stock story utilized in sexual
harassment in housing cases is problematic because, by excluding race
from the story and thus from the judicial analysis, the stock story
perpetuates the very stereotypes and structural forces that have
operated throughout American history to ignore and permit

73. See Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 117, 122 (2002) (pointing to stock characters like “the heroic firefighter, the Good
Samaritan” and “pernicious stories” such as “the helpless woman victim, the crack whore,
the lascivious fag”).
74. See DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW
SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS 49 (2002).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 77–79.
76. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 75, 76–77 (2008) (recognizing harms
flowing from the stock story of a domestic violence victim); Adele M. Morrison, Changing
the Domestic Violence (Dis)course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2006) (critiquing the domestic violence stock story as
one filtered through the White woman’s lens and contending that adherence to that
narrative silences women of color and ignores their abuse); see also Elengold, supra note
21, at 240–42 (critiquing the stock story of sexual harassment in housing as ignoring the
effect of race on experiences of such harassment).
77. See, e.g., Elengold, supra note 21, at 240–42; Gerald Torres, Translation and
Stories, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1367–68 (2002) (recognizing the benefit and risks of
stock stories and, using labor organizing as an example, recognizing when stock stories
must be changed or challenged); Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of A Myth: Why
Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an
Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 416–24 (2009) (discussing the stock story of the
insertion of sex into Title VII).
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”).
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continued sexual abuse of Black women in the home.79 Dependence
on stock stories can reinforce, rather than remedy, structural forces
and inequities that perpetuate discrimination.
Reliance on a simple stock story is an advocacy choice that
ignores intersectional discrimination and eliminates the opportunity
for courts to remedy the complex harm. By relying on simplistic
tropes or one-dimensional stock characters, advocates do not push
factfinders to understand or even seek to remedy intersectional
discrimination. In addition to the fact that stock stories are readily
available and infused in our cultural consciousness, the way that civil
rights statutes are built around rigid protected classes also reinforces
the stock story choice. The doctrinal concerns reflected by the courts’
unwillingness to explode the rigid silos of the protected classes is both
a cause and effect of advocates’ adherence to the simplistic stock
story.
C.

Agencies: The Failure of the Standard Form

Agencies have a significant amount of control and influence in
both individual claims of discrimination and development of
antidiscrimination doctrine. In Title VII actions, for example, a
potential plaintiff in a federal lawsuit must first file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before
suing in federal court.80 In housing discrimination cases, a potential
plaintiff is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies, but
the Fair Housing Act provides for inexpensive and relatively efficient
adjudication through an administrative process at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and its state
corollaries.81 The problem is that the agencies rely on standard forms
that were developed to track the antidiscrimination statutes; statutes
that, as described above, provide protection based on rigidly defined
protected classes.

79. The “dirty old man” narrative describes an “aberrant bad actor male landlord
abusing his authority to take advantage sexually of women who, because of economic
circumstances, have no alternatives.” See Elengold, supra note 21, at 229; see also Regina
Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 552–54 (analyzing Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, Inc. and concluding that use of the stock story of a well-meaning organization
exhibiting “sympathy for poor black youngsters and desperation about stemming ‘the
epidemic’ of teenage pregnancy that plagues them” actually “replicate[s] the very
economic hardships and social biases that, according to the district court, made the role
model rule necessary in the first place”).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012).
81. Id. § 3610.
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A plaintiff filing a complaint with the EEOC or HUD fills out a
standard form that is designed to be easy for both the (usually pro se)
complainant and the agency, which must sift through far too many
complaints.82 The forms have boxes to check and demographic data to
set forth.83 The EEOC Intake Questionnaire, for example, is a fourpage form.84 It asks for personal information that includes check
boxes for race and sex.85 It requests fill-in-the-blank style information
on the alleged perpetrator of the discrimination, employment data,
witnesses for the incidents, and prior charges filed.86 It asks “[w]hat is
the reason (basis) for your claim of employment discrimination” and
provides ten check-boxes based on legally protected classes.87 Neither
the form nor the one-page instruction sheet provide any information
or guidance on how to determine the basis for a complainant’s
treatment or the consequences of checking certain boxes and not
others.88 Further, the form provides a one-line fill-in-the-blank style
question for the complainant to insert information about the
discriminatory action, inviting the complainant to “attach additional
pages if needed.”89 Once the complaint is received, agency employees
determine what kind of claim to charge, a decision upon which
federal courts heavily rely later in the life of the action.90 In many
cases, the choices the claimant makes on the form have a preclusive
82. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, FY2014–FY2015, at 10 (stating that
HUD and its Fair Housing Assistance Program grantees investigated nearly 8,500
complaints in each of fiscal years 2014 and 2015, which are exclusive of those complaints
investigated by state and regional fair housing entities); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS, FY1997–FY2016, https://www1.eeoc.gov
//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm?renderforprint=1 [https://perma.cc/SL8AA3S7] (nearly 90,000 charges filed by individuals at the EEOC in fiscal year 2015).
83. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, https://egov.eeoc.gov/eas
/uniformintakequestionnaire09.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KGB-4LUG]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
AND URBAN DEV., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT, https://portal.hud.gov/FHEO903/Form903/Form903Start.action
[https://perma.cc/KM69-PZDX].
84. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The form also notes, “If you feel you were treated worse for several reasons,
such as your sex, religion[,] and national origin, you should check all that apply.” Id.
88. Id. The instruction sheet does offer a website to “find out more information about
the laws we enforce and our charge-filing procedures.” Id. Nowhere on the website does it
explain “mixed-motive” discrimination, provide information about multiple claims of
discrimination, or the preclusive effect of the charge of discrimination. See U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov [https://perma.cc/LM87-WMCY].
89. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
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effect; the boxes the complainant checks can be used by the
defendant as a sword to dismiss alternative claims.91 Because
complainants are usually pro se at the administrative agency stage,92
many do not have the legal sophistication to understand the effects of
their choices. Nor does the form even suggest that there may be
downstream consequences of checking certain boxes.93 Not only does
such a system fail individual complex complainants, but because
courts rely so heavily on the formulaic assessment of discrimination,
the agency process has a significant influence on the doctrine’s
development.
II. SCHOLARSHIP: LIMITS OF INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY AS
APPLIED TO ANTIDISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
Intersectionality is often given as an answer to the failures of
antidiscrimination law to remedy discrimination for complex
plaintiffs. In other words, if only advocates, agencies, and courts
would understand intersectionality, antidiscrimination law might
respond more adequately to intersectional plaintiffs. But nearly three
decades after Crenshaw’s path-breaking work, intersectionality
theory has not gained a strong foothold in civil rights jurisprudence.94
This Part focuses on two points of disconnect between
intersectionality theory and antidiscrimination jurisprudence and
practice that has limited intersectional plaintiffs’ success in the
courtroom.

91. See, e.g., Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491–92 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming
dismissal of retaliation claim where the plaintiff “did not check the retaliation box on her
charge form, and the narrative explaining her charge made no mention of retaliation”);
Luna v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 54 F. App’x 404, 2002 WL 31687698, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct.
22, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (stating that because plaintiff “failed
to mark the box indicating his intention to bring a claim of national origin
discrimination. . . . [He] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim”);
Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff could not proceed with a race discrimination claim because her EEOC Charge of
Discrimination was limited to sex discrimination); Cohens v. Md. Dep’t of Human Res.,
933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (D. Md. 2013) (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff
“neither checked the ‘retaliation’ box on her EEOC charge nor alleged retaliation in the
charge’s factual summary”). Although courts should not apply a rigid exclusion of claims
based solely on the check boxes, the forms have a preclusive effect in practice. See infra
Section IV.C.
92. See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc
/V27R-GMRJ] (explaining the process of investigation after filing a charge with the
EEOC).
93. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83.
94. See supra notes 32–43 and accompanying text.
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The first barrier to implementing intersectionality theory in
antidiscrimination law is the challenge that the theory is under
inclusive, or reductionist. In other words, intersectionality theory
simplifies an extremely complex idea (identity and bias associated
with another’s identity) to the point of distortion.95 Devon W.
Carbado and Mitu Gulati explore the simplicity and reductionism of
the “metaphor of intersectionality” by analyzing its application to a
traditional Venn diagram.96 Traditional notions of intersectional
identity, as shown on a Venn diagram, are represented by two
overlapping circles, one representing a disenfranchised sex group
(e.g., female or female-ness)97 and the other representing a
disenfranchised racial group (e.g., Black or Black-ness). The overlap
between the circles represents the identity and experience of the
intersectional individual (i.e., Black woman).

95. Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 673, 687 (2000).
96. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 705–06. Others have similarly employed a
Venn diagram to discuss intersectionality. See Arin N. Reeves, Race as a Red Herring?
The Logical Irrelevance of the Race vs. Class Debate, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 835, 838–40
(2011) (using the Venn diagram concept to discuss the intersection of race and class
inequities); Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in the Workplace: The Case for
“Race Plus,” 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 86 (2010) (using the Venn diagram to discuss
a “race plus” approach to antidiscrimination law).
97. As anthropologists, sociologists, and legal scholars continue to recognize the
complexity of sex, gender, and gender identity, the circle defined as “sex” must encompass
more than just “female.” See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond A Medical Model: Advocating
for A New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713,
719–30 (2005) (assessing the biological and medical models of gender within the law and
advocating for a model of gender self-determination in the law).
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Figure 1: In the traditional intersectionality Venn diagram,
circle A represents a subordinated gender group (e.g., female or
female-ness) and circle B represents a subordinated racial
group (e.g., Black or Black-ness). The overlap, represented by
area 2, denotes the intersection.
Carbado and Gulati explicitly note that the Venn diagram is too
simplistic and crude of a tool to capture the complexity of Crenshaw’s
theory of intersectionality,98 but also recognize that the metaphor of
intersectionality is deep-seated and resilient.99 And intersectionality
theory’s primary association with women of color provides fuel for
the critique of under-inclusivity.100
The second barrier to implementing the theory in practice is the
challenge that intersectionality theory is over inclusive because it can
be applied to an infinite number of identity intersections, with no
logical boundaries.101 Without natural boundaries, critics suggest that

98. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 706 (“The diagram suggests that there are
social moments in which race and gender exist apart from each other as ‘pure’ identities.
Although the metaphor of intersectionality conveys this idea, the fully theory of
intersectionality, and certainly Crenshaw’s conceptualization of this theory, rejects it.
Fundamental to intersectionality theory is the notion that race and gender are
interconnected; they do not exist as disaggregated identities . . . .”).
99. See id.
100. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, New Complexity Theories: From Theoretical
Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 UMKC L. REV. 431, 437 (2002) (“Intersectionality
theorists typically have failed to make this positional shift, due to their singular focus on
‘women of color’ and their failure to theorize the universality of complex subordination.”).
101. Kwan, supra note 95, at 687 (“[A]s identity categories multiply within any set of
circumstances, the ability of intersectionality to provide theoretical insights is
correspondingly compromised.”).
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intersectionality theory provides no defined group to study or protect.
Empiricists, for example, assert that it is impossible to theorize about
or study a group when each person in that group is “composed of a
complex and unique matrix of identities that shift over time, is never
fixed, is constantly unstable and forever distinguishable from that of
everyone else in the universe.”102 Because of the seemingly infinite
reach of intersectionality, courts have complained that introduction of
intersectional discrimination into antidiscrimination law causes a
slippery slope problem. One court, for example, complained that
introduction of intersectional discrimination would create a “manyheaded Hydra” that antidiscrimination laws cannot contain.103
The concerns of the under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity of
intersectionality theory limit the theory’s useful application to
antidiscrimination doctrine.104 They also operate to blind us from
understanding how the experiences of one group can be analogous to
the experiences of another group. The under-inclusive critique
suggests that intersectionality theory posits that a single group
(usually Black women) has some undefined unique experience that
cannot be replicated or understood outside of that group. Similarly,
the over-inclusive critique of intersectionality reveals the threat of
infinite intersections overtaking the ability to categorize and thus,
study and protect. Either one of those lenses then obscures the ability
to see how one form of intersectional bias (i.e., discrimination against
a Black female) is analogous to and different from other forms of
complex bias.105
Scholars
have
recognized
the
disconnect
between
intersectionality theory and civil rights doctrine.106 Further, scholars
have pushed on the simple metaphor of intersectionality and

102. Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
1257, 1277 (1997).
103. Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986).
104. I am not sure that intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists would
consider the inapplicability of the theory to antidiscrimination doctrine as a limitation of
the theory itself because many believe that the antidiscrimination doctrine is
fundamentally flawed and beyond redemption. That is a worthwhile conversation to have,
but outside the scope of this Article. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. To the
extent that one wishes to import the lessons of intersectionality theory to
antidiscrimination doctrine, as this Article aims to do, it is necessary to address the
critiques of under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity.
105. Kwan, supra note 95, at 687 (“[I]ntersectionality’s reductionism does not allow us
to forge ideological coalitions, political allegiances nor communities of support . . . .”).
106. See supra notes 32–43 and accompanying text.
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reframed the construct through different “post-intersectionality”107
lenses—identity performance theory,108 multiple consciousness,109 and
intercategorical comparisons,110 for instance—and with different
names—identity multiplicity,111 cosynthesis,112 interconnectivity,113 and
multidimensionality,114 for example.115 Scholars, in fact, have
expanded the concept of intersectionality to multiple groups and axes
of identity.116 Intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists
have made profound contributions to our understanding of identity
and bias. And yet there remains a disconnect between the recognition
of intersectional discrimination and the legal remedy of such
discrimination.117
107. Kwan, supra note 95, at 686 (noting that scholars are “moving in the direction of
post-intersectional theories”).
108. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 701–02.
109. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 297, 299 (1992).
110. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and
Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 531, 563 (2013);
Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1773–74 (2005).
111. Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467, 1518 (2000).
112. Kwan, supra note 95, at 673, 687; Kwan, supra note 102, at 1257.
113. Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities
& Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 25, 57–66 (1995).
114. D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in the
Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FIU L. REV. 333, 338–41 (2013); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309–11
(2001) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Identity Crisis]; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29
CONN. L. REV. 561, 618 (1997) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen].
115. Many engaged in post-intersectionality theorizing recognize Kimberlé Crenshaw’s
own statement that her intersectionality theory is a “provisional concept linking
contemporary politics with postmodern theory.” Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 1244 n.9.
116. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit
Possibilities: Culture, Gender, and Sex©, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812 (1999); Hutchinson,
Out Yet Unseen, supra note 114, at 563–65; Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation
in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social
Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars As Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409,
1420 (1998).
117. Perhaps the reason for the disconnect in scholarship stems from intersectionality
theory’s position within the critical race theory movement. Critical race theory is “a
collection of critical stances against the existing legal order from a race-based point of
view.” Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 85, 85 (1994). Several critical race theorists
have rejected the current antidiscrimination doctrine as a tool to deal with intersectional
identity and discrimination. See Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1334 (recognizing that some
Critical Legal Studies scholars absolutely reject the notion that rights-based approaches to
civil rights are compatible with institutional social change). Other race crits have gone
even further, questioning whether rights-based antidiscrimination law is a worthwhile tool
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This Article recognizes the critically important insights that
intersectionality and post-intersectionality theorists have developed
over the past thirty years. Such theories and theorists have exposed
the failures of feminist and antiracist movements in erasing the
experiences of people with intersectional identities, including Black
women. Thoughtful scholars have explained how race, sex, and other
personal identity traits cannot legitimately be disentangled from one
another.118 Critical race scholars have explored the many ways in
which social and cultural privilege is embedded in the White male
heteronormative experience.119 And critical scholars’ hesitancy to
embrace the rights-based antidiscrimination law structure reveals
compelling concerns with the current statutory scheme.120 This Article
recognizes and is shaped by those insights. It borrows those insights to
push on antidiscrimination laws and lawyering to shift to a more
inclusive, rather than the currently exclusive, approach to assessing
discrimination in housing, employment, public accommodations, and
more. To do that, Part III introduces a brand-new framework—the
cluster framework—as a bridge between the theory and practice, to
both address intersectional discrimination in antidiscrimination
doctrine and to utilize analogies between and across subgroup
discrimination.121
III. INTRODUCING THE CLUSTER FRAMEWORK
This Article draws on the insights and critiques of
intersectionality theory to propose a new framework for pleading,
litigating, and analyzing intersectional claims of discrimination within
the antidiscrimination doctrine. The new framework, which this
Article calls the “cluster framework,” diverges from intersectionality
and post-intersectionality theories by centering itself within the
current antidiscrimination doctrine. The cluster framework involves
(1) reimagining intersectional discrimination through an image of

in pursuing the fight for racial justice. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 26, at 95–96. While
this Article does not ignore the clear drawbacks and failures of antidiscrimination law, it
seeks to use the legal tools that we currently have to their fullest scope and strength. See
Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1356–58 (recognizing both the transformative power of
antidiscrimination law and the dangers of the rights-based approach in legitimizing a
structure that has traditionally subordinated Blacks).
118. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 114, at 309–10.
119. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 116, at 1415–16, 1416 n.24.
120. See Caldwell, supra note 26, at 95–96; Crenshaw, supra note 26, at 1334.
121. Such an approach certainly does not go as far as many may desire, but absent
radical change to the doctrine, it does provide a theory and concrete steps for incremental
change to the current system.
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coterminous, rather than overlapping, circles of identity; (2)
relocating intersectional discrimination within those coterminous
circles and thus, squarely within the definition of any one of the
relevant protected classes; (3) explicitly defining discrimination to
include the categorizing, stereotyping, and subjugation of certain
subgroups of the protected class, thus accounting for the relationship
between individual discrimination and structural inequities; and (4)
recognizing the full range of harms that flow from complex
discrimination—to the individual, her community, her subgroup and
her group. Such a framework addresses the critiques of
intersectionality theory in a civil rights action, allowing for analogies
to, and coalitions with, other subgroups experiencing discrimination.
For ease of understanding, this Part will use race-sex discrimination as
the lens to describe the cluster framework more specifically.
A. Reimagining the Venn Diagram
Return to the Venn diagram of the prevailing metaphor of
intersectionality, which imagines one circle symbolizing a subjugated
racial group (e.g., Black or Black-ness) overlapped, in some part, by a
circle symbolizing a subjugated sex group (e.g., female or femaleness).122 This Article reimagines the Venn diagram. Similar to the
theories of “cosynthesis”123 and “multidimensionality,”124 the circles of
the revised Venn diagram are layered on top of one another. Under
the cluster framework, however, the circles are not defined by a
subjugated group; the circles represent the traditionally protected
classes in antidiscrimination law.
If considering race-sex discrimination, for example, one might
draw a circle representing sex, not female sex or female-ness. That
circle encompasses one axis of a graph, represented in the graphic
below by horizontal lines. The lines within the circle represent the
sex-gender continuum, as externally identified, from male-ness to
female-ness.125 The continuum is understood from an external (rather
122. See supra text accompanying notes 96–99.
123. See Kwan, supra note 102, at 1280–81 (theorizing that categorization—the ways
that we identify ourselves and identify others—are multi-layered and not static, such that
they create prisms that “multipl[y] the boundaries between categories”).
124. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 114, at 309 (theorizing that
systems of oppression are inherently complex, such that they account for multiple axes of
oppression—“racism, heterosexism, patriarchy, and class oppression,” for example—none
of which can be disentangled from the social identity categories “around which social
power and disempowerment are distributed”).
125. See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON THE
FREEDOM OF GENDER 13 (1995) (proposing a continuum of sex “along a broad
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than internal) perspective because the bias underlying discrimination
claims is external, from the perspective of the perpetrator. The
continuum lens is particularly useful because a critical part of sex
discrimination jurisprudence involves a perpetrator discriminating
against a victim who does not comport with the stereotypes or social
constructions of gender, which sit along a continuum.126 Then,
because all persons, regardless of sex, are identified with race,127 one
might draw another circle coterminous with the first. The second
circle represents race and encompasses another axis of a graph,
represented by vertical lines. Like the sex circle, the race circle is also
a continuum. Understanding that race is socially constructed,128 we
must also recognize that race is assigned, often based on “phenotype,
skin color, and eye/hair/other physiological aspects that often define[]
Blacks in the United States.”129 Taking discrimination against an
African American, for example, the continuum would gradate from
white-ness to black-ness, based on those visual cues of race.130 As with

continuum of possibilities”). That is not to say that the antidiscrimination law recognizes a
gender continuum; the very thrust of this paper is that the protected class categories are
rigid and distinct. Further, there is a distinction between sex and gender, which must be
acknowledged. The continuum, however, conflates the two. It does so consciously. The
language of the antidiscrimination statutes use the term “sex,” so they prohibit “sex
discrimination.” The courts, however, have recognized sex stereotyping and gender
stereotyping to create cognizable claims of sex discrimination. See infra note 126. Because
the cluster framework theory is only useful when applied to the state of the law as it exists,
it is necessary to understand the continuum this way.
126. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257–58 (1989) (finding that
plaintiff’s allegation that she faced adverse employment consequences because she was
overly aggressive and did not act or present as feminine enough was cognizable as a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195,
200–01 (2d Cir. 2017) (recognizing a gender stereotyping claim under Title VII’s
prohibition against sex discrimination); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir.
2004) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender
discrimination under Title VII).
127. There is strong evidence that race is socially, not biologically constructed. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026–28 (11th Cir. 2016) (recognizing
that the EEOC, certain courts, and the dictionary have determined that race is recognized
as a social, rather than biological, construct); Ho ex rel. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating “[t]hat race is a social construct”). That
fact, however, does not change the analysis for purposes of the law. Under the law, race is
an identifiable trait and one that is protected under both the Constitution and civil rights
laws. See Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1028 (“But our possible current reality does
not tell us what the country’s collective zeitgeist was when Congress enacted Title VII half
a century ago.”).
128. See supra note 127.
129. Salvador Vidal-Ortiz, People of Color, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY,
& SOCIETY 1037 (Richard T. Schaefer ed., 2008).
130. It is worth recognizing here that this Part consciously conflates the protected
classes of race and color. The relationship between those categories is complicated and has
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the sex-gender continuum, the race continuum is understood from an
external (rather than internal) perspective because the bias
underlying discrimination claims is external. Those coterminous
circles could be replicated for any number of protected characteristics
and additional axes could layer on top.131

Figure 2: Under the cluster framework, there are two
coterminous circles. One circle, marked with vertical lines,
represents race. The other circle, marked with horizontal lines,
represents sex. The overlap between the two is complete. Each
dot in the coterminous circles represents an individual
intersectional identity. The individual identities then create
clusters.

led to scholarly debates. See supra note 23. While it might muddy the waters to conflate
the two protected classes, the fact of the matter is that race is generally identified by the
color of one’s skin and other racially-ascribed physical traits. It is also true that there is a
recognized relationship between the shade of skin tone and bias or discrimination. See
Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The Continuing Significance of Color Under Title VII
Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 435, 445–59 (2005) (citing a
number of studies evidencing the relationship between a darker skin tone and adverse
reactions).
131. This Article limits the application of the cluster framework to the currentlyidentified protected classes in the various civil rights laws. Because the goal of this Article
is to consider how scholars and advocates may use the current antidiscrimination tools to
more adequately remedy intersectional discrimination, it is natural to begin the analysis
within the bounds of the current laws. That is not to say, however, that the current
protected classes are correct or sufficient. Changing or adding to the protected classes,
however, is outside the scope of this Article.
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Once the coterminous circles are drawn, one can imagine tiny
dots representing individual intersectional identities. Each person is
represented by a dot in the coterminous circles, representing the
intersection of his/her individual race and sex. As dots fill in the
larger circles, multi-dimensional clusters will develop symbolizing
groups of individuals with similar identities along the continuums. For
example, a cluster will develop that represents Black women.
The concept of coterminous circles more explicitly recognizes the
inextricable nature of categories or statuses of identity and bias.132
And pulling the circles back to represent the entire protected class
(e.g., sex), rather than limiting the circle to subordinated subgroup of
the class (e.g., female), does work toward answering the critiques of
intersectionality theory as applied to civil rights jurisprudence in two
specific ways. First, it explicitly recognizes that every individual is
intersectional and that those intersections cross innumerable axes to
create individuals who experience life and bias in individual ways.
Second, it provides a plane on which we can begin to see the
connections between subgroups, rather than utilizing a unique Venn
diagram for each intersection. The sections below will further draw
out those benefits.
B.

Connecting the Venn Diagram to Structural Inequities

The recast Venn diagram, by itself, will likely suffer the same
critiques as the traditional intersectionality Venn diagram when
applied in civil rights jurisprudence. For courts, it does not provide an
explanation for why certain subgroups should be protected under the
antidiscrimination statutes. In other words, it does not answer the
“many-headed Hydra” concern.133 For that reason, the cluster
framework adds an additional dimension—that of structural
inequities. It is the relationship between certain subgroups (clusters of
individuals) and the structural inequities suffered by that cluster that
explain why certain subgroups should be studied and protected as a
group, even if their individual experiences are not identical.
What are structural inequities? For purposes of this Article,
structural inequities are based not on individual actions or biases, but
arise from the social, cultural, and legal systems that were built on
and perpetuate unfair, discriminatory, or disproportionate results for
132. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60, at 705–06; Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra
note 114, at 309–10; Kwan, supra note 102, at 1277.
133. See Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). For the same reasons, it
also fails to answer theorists’ and empiricists’ questions about why certain subgroups or
intersectional groups should be studied.
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certain subgroups.134 While there are innumerable inequities in our
society, to provide a concrete explanation, this Article identifies three
that prominently and adversely affect women of color, particularly
Black women. One is the effect of laws that have operated to Black
women’s detriment. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act,
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act—the major New Deal welfare
programs—explicitly or implicitly excluded African Americans.135
Although legal protections were later extended, vestiges of the
exclusion remain deeply ingrained in our legal psyche and culture.136
Exclusionary laws and policies exacerbate the second structural
inequity, which is intergenerational wealth disparity.137 In America
134. See Elengold, supra note 21, at 232 (arguing that adoption of a standard narrative
about sexual harassment in housing “disregards the way that [structural] factors have
operated throughout American history to institutionalize the disempowerment of Black
women, especially in the domestic sphere”); Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing
Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.
233, 240 (2006) (including the decades-long disinvestment in urban cities and the “role of
law in configuring relations of power and in marginalization of class structures” in
assessment of the structural inequities underlying economic subordination).
135. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights,
50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1678 (2001) (“[A] political compromise Franklin Roosevelt had made
with southern Dixiecrats left agricultural and domestic workers—the two occupational
categories to which most African Americans in the South belonged—without redress in
the New Deal labor legislation. They were excluded from the benefits of the National
Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and other labor and social welfare
legislation. Despite its basis in the Commerce Clause and its aspirations for
comprehensive regulation and labor market unity, the New Deal’s nationalizing project
was, therefore, only partial.”); William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in
America Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) (“Take the original exclusion of
agricultural and domestic workers from eligibility for Social Security benefits in 1935.
Because they could not collect old-age or unemployment benefits, field hands,
sharecroppers, maids, and nannies—constituting the bulk of the black labor force in the
New Deal South—were shut out from even the most modest opportunity that whites
enjoyed for wealth accumulation and survival assistance in economic downturns. In this
example, blacks were not explicitly excluded, but the proxy phrase ‘agricultural and
domestic workers’ did the job effectively. Nor was this anomalous: African Americans
were excluded implicitly or through administrative fiat from all major New Deal welfare
programs, including the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.”).
136. Cf. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, And
Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 43 (2006)
(recognizing that “[t]he influence of slavery and racism on criminal prosecutions and
punishments cannot be overemphasized” and noting that “the centuries-long history of
disparate treatment of Black rape victims continues today”).
137. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (exposing how
the legacy of de jure structural segregation at all levels of government created and
promoted wide-spread neighborhood racial segregation that persists today); Andrea
Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2017) (“The
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today, Black women experience poverty at nearly double the rate of
White women, are more than twice as likely to live in inadequate
housing, and “have less education and higher rates of
underemployment, poverty, disease, and isolation than white
women.”138 The wealth gap is generational: it is rooted in the history
of the long-standing racial hierarchy in America,139 and its effects will
snowball into the future.140 Finally, the third structural inequity is the
existence of cultural stereotypes that create particularized
vulnerability to certain kinds of discrimination and harassment. Black
women, for example, are habitually subjected to three primary myths
or stereotypes—Mammy, Jezebel, and Sapphire141—which make them
vulnerable to sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The Mammy
image, born in the post-slavery South, is characterized as an asexual,
obese, dark-skinned, subordinate domestic worker “with large breasts
and a broad grin.”142 The Jezebel myth describes Black women as
sexually insatiable and promiscuous.143 Finally, the Sapphire
stereotype, stoked by Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 widelycirculated report on “The Negro Family: The Case for National
Action,”144 is characterized as outspoken, tenacious, emasculating,
loud, brash, nagging, and acting outside her proper role in society.145

20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United States is not a manifestation of
cultural or individual differences, but the product of a long history of discriminatory laws
and policies that inscribed racial disparities into society.” (footnote omitted)).
138. MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND
BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 46 (2011).
139. Id. at 206.
140. See, e.g., Paul Kiel and Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits
Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org
/article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods
[https://perma.cc/5WCG2FZ6] (investigating the way that the inter-generational wealth gap between Black and
White communities leads to increased debt in Black communities and a further increase in
the wealth gap across generations).
141. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 33 (“Mammy, Jezebel, and Sapphire are
common and painful characterizations of black women and . . . each has a long history in
American social and cultural life.”).
142. Carolyn M. West, Violence, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 281 (Darlene Clark
Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
143. See HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 54–68; Austin, supra note 79, at 570;
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 11–12 (1993).
144. OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN. & RES., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 9–14 (1965), https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history
/webid-meynihan.htm [https://perma.cc/L2HP-PFQW].
145. See Melissa N. Stein, Race as a Social Construction, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN
AMERICA 1, 8 (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005) (“Sapphire is represented as less than
a woman, and thus undeserving of the protections afforded to proper ladies, yet not a man,
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Those stereotypes operate to explain and permit sexual abuse and sex
discrimination of Black women.146
Considering the relationship between complex identity, complex
bias, and structural inequities is one answer to the related critiques
(reductionism and infiniteness) of intersectionality theory as applied
to the civil rights rubric. Imagine, once again, the race-sex Venn
diagram, reconstructed under a cluster framework. For purposes of
civil rights doctrine, it offers courts an explanation of why protecting
certain subgroups will not overrun the antidiscrimination statutes or
Congress’ intent in enacting them because it limits protection to the
loci of clusters. For purposes of advocacy, it offers a lens through
which to explain to the factfinder why comparator groups must be
thoughtfully construed. For example, in a case of discrimination
against a Black female, one might argue that a comparator should be
any non-Black person or any male. That is because if a Black female
is fired for being a Black female, she should be able to point to
anyone who is not a Black female as a comparator. And, although it is
outside the scope of this Article, it offers a potential framework for a
legislature to consider why certain subgroups currently unprotected
under civil rights statutes should, perhaps, gain protection.
Imagine, also, a cluster of individuals representing Black women.
Imagine further that, by expanding the coterminous circles beyond
race and sex, we could place a handful of dots in our diagram
representing upper-class lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana.
Intersectionality has failed to take hold in civil rights legislation and
doctrine in part because of the failure to explain why civil rights laws
should specifically protect Black women and not upper-class lesbian
despite her masculine persona, affording her none of the rights associated with (white)
manhood.”).
146. Different stereotypes, biases, and cultural tropes are applied to different
subgroups of women. For example, the “separate spheres” ideology, which has been a
mainstay of feminist thought, more aptly and appropriately defines the stereotyping that
White women face in our culture. See Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 154–56; see also Sumi K.
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority
Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 181 (1997) (discussing “how
converging racial and gender stereotypes of [Asian Pacific American] women help
constitute what I refer to as ‘racialized (hetero)sexual harassment’”). It is useful to think
of the different stereotypes and other structural inequities that are applied to different
groups of women to truly recognize the different burdens that different subgroups of
women have borne throughout our society. See Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 155
(“Feminists have attempted to expose and dismantle separate spheres ideology by
identifying and criticizing the stereotypes that traditionally have justified the disparate
societal roles assigned to men and women. Yet this attempt to debunk ideological
justifications for women’s subordination offers little insight into the domination of Black
women.” (citation omitted)).
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White veterinarians from Indiana. The answer lies in the structural
inequities that make Black women particularly vulnerable to
discrimination and therefore, an appropriate subgroup to study and
protect.147 When considering the individuals who identify as upperclass lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana, that group of
individuals suffers no structural inequities unique to the group.148 The
cluster framework preserves the ability to recognize structural
inequities as applied to varied groups of individuals beyond Black
women while at the same time recognizing a break in the slippery
slope.149
C.

Relocating Complex Race-Sex Discrimination in
Antidiscrimination Law

With an eye toward avoiding the pitfalls of pleading multiple
claims of discrimination,150 the cluster framework is best situated
wholly within a singular protected class. For race-sex discrimination,
this Article suggests conceptualizing the intersectional discrimination
as sex discrimination. Recognizing the mistreatment of subgroups of
women as sex discrimination is not new to feminist advocacy. Rather,
it draws on a feminist framework that defines sex discrimination to
include the categorization,151 stereotyping, and subjugation of certain
subgroups of women.

147. See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and ClassicalLiberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without A Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV.
787, 832 (1994) (“Intersectionality posits that African American women share unique life
experiences that differ from those of either African American men or white women.”);
Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 152–60 (recognizing that feminist theory has ignored the
unique combination of race and gender issues faced by African American women).
148. That is not to say that a woman who falls into this identity category cannot seek
protection under antidiscrimination law, even when applying the cluster framework. She
may, for example, seek a remedy for sex discrimination because of bias she experienced as
a lesbian. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College, 853 F.3d 339, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (recognizing sexual orientation as a subset of sex discrimination under Title VII).
The point of this example is to say that Title VII does not offer protection for her
membership in a group of upper-class lesbian White veterinarians from Indiana under the
cluster framework.
149. The cluster framework operates within and subscribes to the traditional
group/subgroup analysis of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes. Not all scholars
agree that such a framework is appropriate to remedying race and/or sex discrimination.
See supra text accompanying notes 106–17. See generally Kramer, supra note 62 (arguing
that the traditional group-based approach to identifying and remedying sex discrimination
does not account for modern sex discrimination and proposing a model adopting a
reasonable accommodation framework).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43.
151. Categorization, by itself, is not necessarily problematic; it is a necessary way that
we make sense of the complicated world around us. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
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Throughout our nation’s history, women have been separated
and categorized. Women are married or unmarried. Women are
childless or mothers. Women work inside the home or outside the
home. And those categories of women have faced different
challenges, different biases, and different experiences. And yet, each
of those categories of women has been the subject of feminist
scholarship and advocacy. In the Seneca Falls Declaration of
Sentiments, the drafters spoke of the rights of women who, when
married, were stripped of civil legal rights and subjected to abuse by
their husbands,152 as well as the rights of women who were members
of the church but who were excluded from the ministry.153 In those
passages, one can see the seeds of defining sexism to include
circumstances where women—based on their identities, choices, and
circumstances—are categorized, stereotyped, and subjugated.
Nineteenth century feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.
Anthony similarly critiqued marriage as connected to concerns about
domestic violence, marital rape, and forced pregnancy, even though
not all women were married and not all married women experienced
domestic violence.154 Second-wave feminists took up different torches,
sown from the same seeds of thought. Aileen Clarke Hernandez, then
president of the National Organization for Women (“NOW”),
declared lesbian rights to be women’s rights.155 Although not all
women are lesbians, Hernandez recognized that the categorization
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 21–26 (2000) (identifying the critical functions of
categorizing: maximizing mental economy, achieving pragmatic utility, providing reference
group relevance, a sense of communal power, and personal gratification, and regulating
risk). Categorization is derived from our society and culture. Id. at 27 (“For the most part,
our categories do not derive from the shape of the world but create it. . . . [M]ost of our
category systems are inherited not from our genetic makeup but from our culture . . . .”).
Where category systems are “used hegemonically, as instruments of power,” however,
especially when derived from race-based and sex-based stereotyping, categorization
carries great risk. Id. at 24.
152. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS, SENECA FALLS (July 19, 1848), reprinted in
FEMINISM: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS 76, 76–77 (Miriam Schneir ed., 1972)
(“He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. . . . In the covenant of
marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all
intents and purposes, her master—the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty,
and to administer chastisement.”).
153. Id. (“He allows her in Church as well as State, but a subordinate position, claiming
Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some exceptions, from
any participation in the affairs of the Church.”).
154. Lucinda N. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal Protection Clause:
Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 446 (2004).
155. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 46 (2011).
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and mistreatment of certain groups of women was an issue for all
women to take up, supporting a NOW resolution to that effect.
Second-wave feminists applied a similar analysis to pregnancy,
asserting that the stereotyping and mistreatment of pregnant women
is sex discrimination that constrains all women.156 Third-wave
feminists have applied the same concepts to identify transgendered
persons’ rights157 and rights for women in the military,158 deeming
rights for those subgroups to be women’s rights. Each has been the
subject of advocacy around legal rights. And each has stood as
representative of the female experience such that subjugation related
to their particular grouping has been deemed a “women’s issue” or a
“women’s rights issue.”
The same theory should be applied to Black women as a
subgroup of women. The discrimination against Black women is sex
discrimination. Situating race-sex intersectional discrimination wholly
within the sex discrimination framework, however, is subject to the
same critiques that gave rise to intersectionality theory in the first
place—claims that Black women should not have to subordinate their
race to their gender and claims that advocacy regarding sex
discrimination has focused on White women and their particular
needs. That is why this Article puts the client’s voice at the center of
any antidiscrimination claim.159 Through client-centered lawyering
and thoughtful narrative, the cluster framework can draw on the
feminist history of protecting subgroups of women without losing
sight of the unique experiences of Black women.
The purpose of situating race-sex discrimination wholly in sex
discrimination is two-fold. First, because intersectional claims are
statistically less successful,160 claims situated wholly within a single
protected class have better chances of success.161 Second, framing

156. See id. at 63–69.
157. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1995); Demoya R. Gordon,
Transgender Legal Advocacy: What Do Feminist Legal Theories Have to Offer?, 97 CALIF.
L. REV. 1719, 1754–61 (2009).
158. See Jamie R. Abrams, Debunking the Myth of Universal Male Privilege, 49 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 325–31 (2016); Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 43 (1999).
159. See infra Section IV.B.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43.
161. One could argue for relocating race-sex discrimination wholly in race
discrimination. Because of the groundwork laid by earlier feminists about subgroup
discrimination, see supra text accompanying notes 152–58, and because of the differential
doctrinal treatment of racial harassment and sexual harassment, see supra text
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race-sex discrimination within sex discrimination allows us to see how
race-sex discrimination is similar to (and different from) other forms
of sex discrimination. It responds to the critique of intersectionality
theory that race-sex intersection (primarily with respect to Black
women) is a unique kind of discrimination that cannot be analogized
to other forms of complex discrimination. And, by relocating the
analysis wholly inside of sex discrimination, it allows us to draw
parallels to other moments in feminist advocacy where the
categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups
of women has been identified as sex discrimination.162 Redrawing the
Venn diagram and relocating intersectional discrimination within
traditional protected classes provides a plane on which we can see the
connections between the experiences of subgroups, rather than
treating each subgroup as separate and distinct.
This is not to say, of course, that the experience of discrimination
against a woman who works outside the home is the same as
discrimination against a Black woman. The insights of
intersectionality theory clearly teach us that they are vastly
different.163 In fact, this Article may well draw criticism from critical
race scholars and others concerned that it might, like feminist
proposals before it, operate to erase Black women’s experiences. That
is not the intent of this Article; the intent, rather, is to push on the
current doctrine to become more, rather than less, inclusive. This
Article recognizes, however, that intent is not always what carries the
day. It also recognizes that there is a political and cultural cost for
those with intersectional identities, including Black women, to fit
their identities and experiences into a framework that was neither
built nor developed to consider, respect, or accommodate complex
identity and experience. The proposed framework, however, is an
effort to bridge the divide between intersectionality theory and
antidiscrimination law. And the concrete proposals set forth in Part
IV are designed to elevate, rather than erase, the stories and
experiences of complex victims of discrimination. For some critics, the
proposals will not go far enough or answer the critiques applied to
White feminism. In the absence of a new statutory design for
redressing discrimination through the law, however, a framework that
allows us to identify analogous subgroups and potential coalitions will
accompanying notes 66–71, this Article suggests that the sex discrimination lens enjoys a
greater chance of success.
162. In fact, women of color were at the helm of some of the most important
expansions of the definition of sex discrimination. See Mayeri, supra note 35, at 722–23.
163. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra notes 184–87.
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open up tools, strategies, and developed law to fight complex
violations of civil rights.
D. Recognizing Direct and Indirect Harms Under a Cluster
Framework
The cluster framework also recognizes that categorizing,
stereotyping, and subjugating subgroups of women harms the
individual woman, her community, her subgroup, and all women. Just
as the Venn diagram provides a visual of the relationship between
individuals, clusters, and the whole, this Article suggests that the
harm of race-sex discrimination begins with the individual victim and
then emanates to her community, her subgroup, and the entire group.
In other words, when a Black woman is the victim of discrimination,
she is injured, her community (i.e., family, neighborhood) is injured,
her subgroup (Black women) is injured, and the entire group
(women) is injured.
Complex race-sex discrimination clearly harms the individual
victim. Courts recognize that a victim of discrimination may seek
damages for actual, economic, or out-of-pocket costs164 and also for
the embarrassment, humiliation, and shame experienced due to the
defendant’s discriminatory conduct.165 Discrimination against a Black
woman also injures her community, including her family, immediate
friends, and neighbors. If discrimination causes loss of employment or
housing, for example, she may fall into debt that will have long-lasting
generational effects on her children and grandchildren.166 Or it may

164. See, e.g., Rivera v. Inc. Vill. of Farmingdale, 29 F. Supp. 3d 121, 134 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
165. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
extended compensatory damages to plaintiffs establishing intentional discrimination under
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B) (2012)); see also Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, § 2, 123 Stat. at 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 note). The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 similarly allow plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages. Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 107(a), 104 Stat. 327, 336 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12117 (2012)); Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95602, sec. 120, § 505, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982–83 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a
(2012)). This Article concentrates on compensatory, rather than punitive damages. For
thorough analysis of punitive damages under the Fair Housing Act, see generally Timothy
J. Moran, Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a
Necessary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2001).
166. See M. William Sermons, America’s Household Balance Sheet: The State of
Lending in America & its Impact on U.S. Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 6
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decrease her ability to pay for food, which has long-term
consequences for children’s education and learning, a key component
in overcoming intergenerational poverty.167 Injury also flows beyond
the victim’s immediate family. In lead poisoning cases, for example,
defendant housing authorities and landlords often know that victims
of lead poisoning are disproportionately young, poor, typically
African American or Hispanic children, to whom juries will award
lower damages based on lifetime earnings potential tables.168
Therefore, “there is less incentive for defendants to take measures to
clean up toxic hazards in the neighborhoods most affected by lead
paint,” which has a more pernicious long-term effect on low-income
minority neighborhoods.169
Complex discrimination also injures the entire subgroup;
discrimination against a Black woman injures Black women. The
most obvious injury is in the perpetuation of stereotypes that
negatively define “otherness” and are used to permit and ignore
discrimination against Black women. The Mammy stereotype, for
example, has been used by those engaging in racialized sexual
harassment to debase and humiliate Black women experiencing such
an assault.170 The Sapphire trope blames Black women for the
emasculation of Black males, along with poverty, crime, and
unemployment,171 and gives support for violence, sexual and
otherwise against Black women.172 And the myth of the Black
Jezebel, which rose out of the tension between the Victorian notions
of chastity and weakness and the commoditization of Black female
slaves, operates to permit sexual abuse against Black women and then

(Dec. 2012), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2-americashousehold-balance-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/39CU-VK2A].
167. See Too Hungry to Learn: Food Insecurity and School Readiness, Children’s
Healthwatch Research Brief, CHILDREN’S HEALTHWATCH (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/toohungrytolearn_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7V6V-CBXJ].
168. See Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2005) (citing Jennifer
Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead
Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (1997); Laura Greenberg, Note, Compensating
the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429 (2001)).
169. Chamallas, supra note 168, at 1441.
170. Carolyn M. West, Violence, in 3 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 281, 281 (Darlene
Clark Hine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
171. MAYERI, supra note 155, at 25.
172. West, supra note 142, at 281–82 (noting that violence was an “appropriate
punishment for their ‘emasculating’ behavior”).
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silence their resistance.173 Just like the other structural inequities
identified above, stereotyping—which is employed regardless of
whether it actually applies to an individual woman174—operates as the
bridge between institutional bias and individual subjugation.175
Just as categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation injures the
victim, her community, and her subgroup, it also has a negative effect
on all women. Paulette Caldwell explains:
Stereotypes and negative images of black women serve many
functions. They separate black and white women from each
other, and limit all women’s choices by perpetuating competing
ideologies of womanhood based on race. . . . The black woman’s
invisibility serves to blind all women and all blacks to the
interactive relationship between race and gender, leads to the
development of legal theories and social policies directed at
either race or gender without fully considering the implications
of such theories and policies, and ultimately assures the
perpetuation of domination on the basis of race and gender for
all women and members of subordinated race.176
Compounded stereotypes—another way to define intersectional
discrimination rooted in stereotypes—negatively affect all women and
perpetuate gender inequality.177 Of course, it should also be said that
when a Black woman endures discrimination, all Blacks are injured.
And one could apply the cluster framework to assert a race-sex
discrimination claim wholly within race discrimination. For the

173. For a full discussion of the relationship between the Jezebel myth and racialized
sexual harassment in housing, see Elengold, supra note 21, at 236–45.
174. See REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 10 (2010).
175. See id. at 9 (“All the dimensions of personality that make that individual unique
are consequently filtered through the lens of a generalized view or preconception of the
group with which the individual is identified.” (footnote omitted)). A stereotype operates
to conceal, or at least dull, each individual’s unique attributes, traits, and characteristics.
The concealment, rooted in stereotype, occurs regardless of whether individual members
of the group possesses the attributes of the stereotype, id.; in that way, all individuals in a
group become subjected to institutionalized and structural bias rooted in the stereotypes
of that group.
176. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 395.
177. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 174, at 29 (asserting that compound stereotypes
“impede the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the realization
of substantive equality”); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy:
Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (discussing both the
difficulty and necessity of coalition-building, “[a]s we look at these patterns of oppression,
we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination are
interlocking and mutually reinforcing”).
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reasons already discussed herein, this Article uses the sex
discrimination claim to illustrate the cluster framework.
Clare Dalton’s exposition on contract doctrine is instructive in
understanding that binary categorization is harmful to both the ingroup and the out-group.178 Dalton identifies dualities present in the
development of contract law to explore the ways that structuring law
and legal analysis in dualities operates to mask, rather than solve, the
problems of unequal access to power and knowledge in contract.179
Drawing on feminist theory, Dalton calls attention to the images of
women and relationships in the cases she analyzes. She discusses how
contract cases embed the image of a woman as either an angel or a
whore.180 That dichotomy operates to distribute power and is a force
that is hidden behind the traditional dualities of contract doctrine.
Dalton exposes the way that images and stereotypes (i.e., angel or
whore) are implicated in the way that laws and doctrine develop over
time.181 Analogizing Dalton’s work to antidiscrimination doctrine, it is
clear that the interaction of categorization and stereotyping in sex
discrimination cases operates to both directly subjugate certain
categories of women and indirectly keep all women in their
stereotyped boxes. A woman is either a mother or not a mother. She
is a woman of color or she is White. If she is not an angel, she must be
a whore; if she is not a whore, she must be an angel. Both
categorizations, while different, place women in impossible and unfair
boxes.182 Because each of these categorizations is, itself, a binary
separation, each category is defined as related to one another.183
178. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J.
997, 1000 (1985).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1110–12.
181. Id.
182. See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541–43 (Cal. 1971) (overturning liquor
licensing law that excluded women bartenders and recognizing that “[t]he pedestal upon
which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as
a cage”). Stereotypes do not have to be objectively negative to lead to subjugation. See
Peggy Li, Hitting the Ceiling: An Examination of Barriers to Success for Asian American
Women, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 140, 149 (2014) (recognizing that “history
[has] shaped the perception of Asian American women as outsiders, ultra-feminine lotus
blossoms, dragon ladies, and model minorities” and that “[t]hese stereotypes, both
positive and negative, have contributed to discrimination against Asian American
women”).
183. In reality, identities are not binary. Not every mother had a child by vaginal birth
or cesarean section; she might have adopted or used a surrogate. And one need only look
at the various identifications for gender or race or color to realize that identity (and
reaction to identity) is not binary. The import of this discussion is that identities are
regularly pitted against each other in a binary fashion. Much has been written about the
ubiquitousness, power, and danger of the Black/White binary in law and society. See, e.g.,
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Because of that oppositional relationship, categorization and
categorical stereotypes operate to constrain both the in-group and
out-group categories in the binary.
As previously noted, discrimination based on a racial subgroup
of women (e.g., Black women) is different than discrimination based
on another subgroup of women (e.g., mothers).184 The difference is
due, in part, to America’s history of subordination of women based
on race and the systemic perpetuation of White supremacy and Black
subjugation.185 In fact, we must be cognizant that those in the “ingroup” may benefit from the stereotyping of or bias against those in
the “out-group.”186 Not all women bear the burden of categorization,
stereotyping and subjugation equally; women of color, and Black
women in particular, have carried the burden of sexual violence, sex
discrimination, and forced silence across our nation’s history.187 The
Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming A
Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 107, 112–15
(2010); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science”
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1214–16 (1997). More recently,
scholars have exposed a slightly different binary understanding of race—minority/White.
Carlos Hiraldo, Arroz Frito with Salsa: Asian Latinos and the Future of the United States,
15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 47, 50 (2008); Imani Perry, Of Desi, J. Lo and Color Matters: Law,
Critical Race Theory the Architecture of Race, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 139, 140 (2005).
184. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra notes 184–87.
185. See Elengold, supra note 21, at 258–69 (identifying the “structural forces inherent
in residential sexual harassment that have operated [throughout American history],
together with the myth of the Black Jezebel, to perpetuate the sexual subjugation of Black
women in the private sphere”).
186. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 891 (2015) (recognizing
the positive effects of implicit bias on members of privileged groups, i.e., “implicit white
favoritism,” in the criminal justice system). Although White women may, in fact, benefit
from the stereotyping and subjugation of Black women, an injustice remains in the way
that stereotypes limit women’s control and autonomy. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 174,
at 20 (explaining that although the process of categorization is a necessary way to make
sense of the complicated world, categorization carries great risk, especially when
stereotyping “operates to ignore individuals’ characteristics, abilities, needs, wishes, and
circumstances in ways that deny individuals their human rights and fundamental freedoms
and when it creates gender hierarchies”).
187. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 162–63 (2011) (discussing the historical use of
sexual assault and sexual harassment of Black women as a form of “social terrorism”). As
a White woman writing in this sphere, I am particularly cognizant of the dangers of coopting the voices of women of color. I have previously disclosed the following:
As a former civil rights lawyer who litigated [residential sexual harassment cases],
this [Article] is meant to highlight the importance of remaining client-centered in
legal representation. For a discussion on the history and development of the clientcentered representation model, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The
Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
There is a reality of White men and women litigating discrimination cases on
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import of the harm analysis therefore is not in recognizing the injuries
themselves, but is in (1) illuminating the way that approaches to
remedying race-sex discrimination can draw on strategies, tools, and
favorable case law analyzing other subgroup discrimination,188 and (2)
harnessing the political power for justice “when we recognize that we
all have a stake” in striking down patterns of oppression, “including
the illegitimate use of categories.”189 The final Part of this Article
applies the lessons of intersectionality theory, post-intersectionality
theories, and the insights of the cluster framework to an
antidiscrimination case.
IV. APPLYING THE INSIGHTS OF INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY TO
SHIFT THE CIVIL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Returning to Tametra Moore’s story, remember that Tametra is
Black and she is female.190 Recall that Tametra sued her employer for
race discrimination and sex discrimination under Title VII, based on
the sexual harassment she experienced at the hands of her
supervisor.191 Part and parcel of the harassment was racial animus,
exposed in the stereotyping of the Black women her supervisor
harassed.192 And then, remember that Tametra lost her suit. Using
Tametra’s story and experience in court to provide perspective, this
Part proposes means of implementing the insights of intersectionality

behalf of people of color, as I have done throughout much of my career. While I
take issue with the historical and structural forces that have created that disparity,
this Article attempts to remind all lawyers, and most specifically White lawyers, to
listen to their clients’ stories and goals and not ignore the impact of race, even in
the face of a standard stock story that excludes race.
Elengold, supra note 21, at 238 n.48. I am concerned that this Article could be
misconstrued as something of an “All Lives Matter” reaction to racialized sexual
harassment. That is not my intention. Rather, I envision a scenario where the presentation
of a race-sex discrimination claim as sex discrimination, if done with the client at the
forefront, will give voice to a woman experiencing intersectional discrimination and an
opportunity to seek compensation that recognizes and remedies the burden she bears in
her individual experience of race-sex discrimination. For a further explanation of how to
lift up the voices of the affected women, see infra Section IV.B.
188. See Carbado, supra note 111, at 1496–97 (noting that comparability arguments can
be useful, but dangerous and recognizing that “[f]acial comparisons of race and sexual
orientation obscure important history”).
189. Kwan, supra note 102, at 1280–81 (“[C]osynthesis offers the view that political
emancipation and the achievement of justice are realizable only when we recognize that
we all have a stake in finding ways to seize control over the legal and cultural forces that
shape and maintain systems of oppression, including the illegitimate use of categories.”).
190. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 1–2.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 3.
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theory, through the cluster framework, to shift antidiscrimination
doctrine in a way that can better account for complex plaintiffs and
intersectional discrimination. It offers three concrete implementation
proposals for shifting the civil rights doctrine—for courts, advocates,
and agencies. Specifically, this Part proposes that courts look beyond
the “sex plus” doctrine, that advocates think critically about the role
of race in developing case theory and making damages demands, and
that agencies take a less formulaic approach to assessing
discrimination claims.
A. Courts: Intersectional Discrimination is More Than “Sex Plus”
This Article suggests that shifting to a cluster framework can do
some work toward overcoming the barriers that have existed for civil
rights plaintiffs asserting intersectional bias. Specifically, bringing
intersectional discrimination claims wholly within a single
discrimination rubric will thwart the courts’ instinct to silo claims and
evidence of discrimination. It will also avoid the false “but for” test
sometimes applied to multiple claims of discrimination. And if
plaintiffs seek damages commensurate with the full extent of their
injuries, the law can develop with a respect for the disproportionate
burden that certain subgroups have carried historically and today.
Some may wonder why the cluster theory is different from or
better than the existing “sex plus” doctrine. The “sex plus” doctrine,
first recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1971 Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.193 decision, recognizes a Title VII violation where an
employer discriminates against a subclass of women because of their
sex plus another characteristic.194 “Sex plus” claims are generally seen
in employment discrimination actions but have also been asserted in
claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause,195 Title IX,196 and
state statutes.197 Although at one point the “sex plus” doctrine
193. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
194. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court in Phillips did not explicitly call the discrimination
“sex plus” and that terminology has never been adopted by the highest court. See E.
Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 474 (1998).
195. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–
19, 121 (2d Cir. 2004).
196. See, e.g., Tingley-Kelley v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774–75
(E.D. Pa. 2010).
197. See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2004);
Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 08–CV–0296, 2009 WL 2900352, at *8–10 (D.
Minn. Sept. 2, 2009); Schmittou v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.011763, 2003 WL
22075763, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2003); Pullar v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701, Hibbing, 582
N.W.2d 273, 276–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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provided some hope for a more holistic, intersectional analysis to
discrimination,198 the doctrine is confused and confusing.199 Courts
have both recognized and rejected the “sex plus” doctrine in cases
involving sex plus motherhood,200 sex plus marital status,201 sex plus
race,202 and sex plus age.203 As such, it provides little guidance to
courts on how to interpret and address complex discrimination.
In addition to its practical flaws, the “sex plus” doctrine is
fundamentally flawed as an answer to the insights of Crenshaw’s
intersectionality theory. Defining race-sex discrimination (or other
forms of intersectional discrimination) under “sex plus” ignores the
insights of intersectionality theory that intersectional identity is not an
additive experience; intersectional discrimination, in other words,
cannot be broken into its component parts and added to one another.
Therefore, courts should be careful to avoid viewing race-sex
discrimination under the “sex plus” doctrine. The cluster framework
offers an alternate approach.
Returning to our race-sex discrimination example, the cluster
framework specifically defines sex discrimination to include the
categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups
of women. That definition is squarely within the standard
antidiscrimination laws.204 When a landlord targets Black women for

198. See, e.g., Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957 (6th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing that plaintiff’s sex bias claim “cannot be untangled from her claim for race
discrimination”); see also Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034
(5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., C/A No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at
*3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007); Berndt v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., No. C03-3174, 2005 WL
2596452, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2005).
199. See Cunningham, supra note 194, at 473–77.
200. Compare Towers v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, No. CV-04-5243, 2007
WL 1470152, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007) (recognizing gender plus motherhood claim),
with Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that
child-rearing was not a “sex-plus” characteristic to be considered under Title VII).
201. Compare Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-99-1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *7–9 (D.
Or. Aug. 6, 2001) (evidence of sex plus marital status raised a genuine issue of material
fact), with Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433–34 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a sex-plusmarital status claim), rev’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
202. Compare Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., C/A No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at
*6 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (recognizing a sex-plus-race claim on behalf of a Black woman),
with Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 779–81 (D.D.C. 1986) (rejecting a sex plus claim on
behalf of a Black woman).
203. Compare Gorzynski v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2010)
(recognizing that a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act is cognizable), with Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 59 F. App’x. 352, 354–
55 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Ass’n, 840 F.2d 1096, 1098, 1101–03 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding racial distribution quotas illegal under the federal Fair Housing Act).
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sexual harassment but does not target White women, that is sex
discrimination.205 When an employer fails to promote a woman who
acts too aggressively, that is sex discrimination.206 When a company
refuses to hire a woman because she is pregnant, that is sex
discrimination.207 The language of “sex plus” obscures the reality of
sex discrimination and sexism. The definition and implementation of
the cluster framework, as discussed herein, treats discrimination
against a subset of women as “pure” sex discrimination—no plus
needed. Such a construction better encompasses the purpose and
meaning behind the antidiscrimination statutes and will avoid falling
prey to the varied whims of local courts in determining what should
or should not count as a “plus” factor. If a woman is treated
differently because she is a woman, that is sufficient to find sex
discrimination. If a subgroup of women is treated differently because
they are women, that is sex discrimination. Tametra was the victim of
sex discrimination. From the beginning, feminists have taught us to
understand sex discrimination broadly and inclusively, even when the
bad action does not negatively affect all women; it is time we, as a
group, apply such principles consistently and emphatically to women
of color.
B.

Advocates: Tell Her Story and Demand Damages

Just because Tametra was a victim of sex discrimination does not
mean that she must ignore the clear effect of race on her experience
of sex discrimination. Civil rights jurisprudence has failed
intersectional plaintiffs because it artificially silos evidence of
discrimination into protected classes and relies on stock stories to
explain and understand the discrimination. Advocates can break that
cycle by using the power of legal storytelling—a concept embraced by
205. In the related cases of United States v. Gumbaytay, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D.
Ala. 2010), and Boswell v. Gumbaytay, No. 2:07-CV-135-WKW, 2009 WL 1515872 (M.D.
Ala. June 1, 2009), several of the victims of the sex discrimination claim asserted that the
sexual harassment was race-motivated. See Plaintiff United States’ Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendant Gumbaytay’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence at
Julian Declaration, at 1, United States v. Bahr, No. 2:08-cv-00573 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 28,
2009); id. at Kemp Declaration, at 1; id. at Williams Declaration, at 2. The same is true in
the housing and lending discrimination case of United States v. First National Bank of
Pontotoc, No. 3:06–cv–00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008), where at least twenty-seven
victims complained of race-motivated sexual harassment. See Joint Stipulation Regarding
Distribution of Settlement Fund at Affidavit Nos. 2–9, 11–24, 26–30, United States v. First
Nat’l Bank of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008).
206. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (including “pregnancy” within the definition of sex
discrimination).
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scholars across legal disciplines208—to peel back the cover of
stereotype and expose the plaintiff’s unique attributes, experience,
and damages. This Part posits that, at every critical step along the
litigation path—complaint, answer, discovery, motion practice,
opening statement, trial testimony, closing statement, and, where
applicable, a settlement agreement or consent decree209—a victim of
intersectional discrimination can tell a story of sex discrimination that
does not ignore or subjugate the effect of race on that experience of
sex discrimination.210
1. Personalizing Case Theory
Case theory is the “storyline” of the case; “the short version of
the lawyer’s story of the case that takes into account the context in
which it is told.”211 In cases like Tametra’s, where race is part and
parcel of her experience of sex discrimination and sexual harassment,
208. In both feminist and critical legal studies’ scholarship, scholars have used stories
to humanize, personalize, explain, augment, or supplant traditional legal discourse. See
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 982 (1991) (stating that
varied feminist narrative approaches share “a preference for the particularity of
description, a belief that describing events or activities ‘from the inside’—that is, from the
perspective of a person going through them—conveys a unique vividness of detail that can
be instructive to decisionmakers”); Caldwell, supra note 176, at 365–71 (applying a similar
approach in critical race theory scholarship).
209. I recognize that the majority of women who experience sex discrimination do not
litigate and, when they do litigate, do not bring cases all the way to trial. Many do not
report the abuse, many have no access to lawyers, and, even when filed in a court of law,
most civil cases settle. Thinking about discrimination in this way, however, has broader
transformational effect. For example, consent decrees often include equitable relief that
affect every woman coming through the defendant’s business and public scrutiny may lead
to policy change, attitude shift, or general public education. See Kramer, supra note 62, at
947 (“[W]e should not think of antidiscrimination law only as a means to right wrongs. In
addition to remedying specific cases of discrimination, antidiscrimination law also
facilitates a critical conversation about identity and difference—a conversation that takes
place in workplaces, in courts, in the media, and in people’s daily lives.”).
210. This is not an endorsement for creating a new stock story. Rather, the power of
narrative in the courtroom is that the lawyer and the client can work together to develop
the case theory that works best for the client. See Ahmad, supra note 73, at 122
(recognizing that legal narratives are “flexible and contingent, subject to the choices that
lawyers and clients make as to what to include and what to exclude, what to foreground
and what to background” (citing Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1995)). Whether or not to utilize stock stories or even
subordinating narratives to the benefit of the client is a complicated decision and requires
appropriate counseling and ethical assessment. See id. This Article does not suggest that a
lawyer should force her client into telling a story of race-sex discrimination if that is not
the path that the client chooses. Rather, it challenges lawyers to have those conversations
with their clients and, as part of the collaborative strategizing around case theory, to think
about both the narrow and broad implications of ignoring race in a case of race-sex
discrimination, including cases of racialized sexual harassment.
211. Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 298 (2002).
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her case theory must succinctly define the characters, relationships,
and motivations.212 In doing so, she could choose to push back on the
stock story and explain how her subgroup (Black women) made her
particularly vulnerable to and affected her experience of sex
discrimination and sexual harassment.213
In Tametra’s case, her attorney proposed and agreed to a siloed
approach to assessing race discrimination and sex discrimination.214 In
the lawyer’s closing statement, for example, the sole connection
between his client’s sex and race discrimination claims he drew for the
jury was: “I do believe that the evidence has shown that she was
sexually harassed; that it was to a certain extent racially motivated.”215
There was no discussion of the specifics of the sexual harassment and
no discussion of the way that race was part and parcel of the
harassment.216 While it is impossible to know the thought process
behind such a strategy without an honest conversation with Tametra’s
lawyer,217 perpetuating a story that silos the evidence ignores that
Tametra’s experience of sexual harassment was intricately connected
to her experience as a Black woman. Not only does the choice
constrain Tametra, but, by failing to push back on the racialized
aspect of her experience, it reinforces the separation between race
and sex, ignores harmful stereotyping, and perpetuates case law
devoid of an understanding of complex discrimination.
Tametra’s lawyer could have considered alternate case theories,
including telling a complex discrimination story through a sex
discrimination claim. Considering the place of intersectional
discrimination—the role of racial animus in sex discrimination
212. Id. (discussing case theory through the narrative, rather than analytical lens,
“provides an explanation for what happened, and in doing so, shapes what happened”).
213. Not every client will want to tell the story of racialized sexual harassment or
racialized sex discrimination. In following a client-centered approach, a lawyer should
discuss the pros and cons of moving forward with an alternate storyline. STEPHEN
ELLMAN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 22 (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the client about the means by
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished . . . .”).
214. See Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, Exhibit E at 14–17, Moore v. Cricket
Commc’n, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 48-5.
215. Transcript of Trial Day 4 of 4 at 28:23–25, Moore v. Cricket Commc’n, Inc., No.
4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2011), ECF No. 67.
216. Id.
217. The public record did not include trial transcripts from the first three days of trial,
which included all of the live testimony. Without that information, it is impossible to know
which facts and allegations did or did not come into evidence. The lawyer may have been
hamstrung by the evidence. Another possibility is that the lawyer and his client chose to
focus on the sexual harassment to the exclusion of race for strategic reasons.
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cases—at all stages in the investigation and litigation of the action
would operate as a constant reminder to advocates and attorneys not
to ignore the intersectional experience of their clients. Tametra’s
lawyer, for example, might have considered the following case theory:
Tametra’s manager, Travis, discriminated against Tametra based on
her sex, using every vulnerability he could identify against her to
intimidate and harass her, including his status as her supervisor and
racialized stereotyping. Tametra’s experience of sexual harassment,
both because she had to endure the harassment and because of Travis’s
reliance on historical legacies of racism and sexual abuse of Black
women to excuse his conduct, caused Tametra great emotional distress.
Should Tametra want to proceed with such a case theory, at every
critical locus—as represented in the factual sections of the complaint,
briefing, opening statement, trial testimony, closing argument,
damages demand, and, where applicable, settlement agreement—the
attorney should articulate a viable sex discrimination claim of
subgroup discrimination without losing sight of the effect of race on
her client’s experience.
Narrative has long been part of sex discrimination claims and
litigation strategy.218 Individualized narrative is a tool to push back on
stock stories and stock characters that are rooted in stereotype and
universal experience. Leigh Goodmark, for example, challenges
advocates to avoid distilling complicated domestic violence stories
down to the stock story for the sole purpose of attaining a protection
order.219 She calls for a rewriting of the victim narrative, a willingness
to tell a counter-narrative story with confidence and in collaboration
with client.220 And Regina Austin has issued a parallel call to action of
Black women and other women of color to push back on standard
tropes and recast stock characters. In Sapphire Bound!, Austin
challenges her female colleagues of color to “get truly hysterical” and
to “take on the role of ‘professional Sapphires’ in a forthright
way. . . .”221 She also recasts the central character in Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club222 from a Black feminist perspective, naming the
motivating stereotypes in the case and retelling the story from a
different perspective. Civil rights advocates and scholars can learn a
lesson from Austin’s willingness and ability to push against stereotype
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
(1988).

AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26.
Goodmark, supra note 76, at 76–77.
Id. at 127–29.
Austin, supra note 79, at 542.
629 F. Supp. 925, aff’d, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh’g denied, 840 F.2d 583
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and offer a parallel narrative with characters recast. By viewing sex
discrimination as the categorization, stereotyping, and subjugation of
subgroups of women, we open a door for scholars and advocates to
tell a story of race-sex discrimination. Through storytelling and
“restorying,”223 claimants, advocates, and scholars can introduce and
ingrain civil rights jurisprudence with a deeper understanding of
complex discrimination. With each telling and retelling of stories of
race-sex discrimination and racialized sexual harassment, we may
begin to explode the silos of the civil rights statutes. We may make
inroads with the court, individual jury members, the media, the client,
and/or with ourselves to better understand intersectionality and
complex bias and discrimination.
2. Damages Implementation: Connecting Individual Story to
Individual Damages
Considering that one thrust of this Article is to recast the stock
story of sex discrimination to account for intersectional
discrimination, advocates should also consider recasting the role of
damages as a tool in that project. Because civil rights remedies
contemplate and permit damages arising directly from the individual
plaintiff’s experience of discrimination, plaintiffs like Tametra should
be fully compensated for their experiences of sexual harassment,
including any injury that arose from the racialized nature of the
harassment.
Courts have found that a victim of discrimination may seek
damages for actual, economic, or out-of-pocket costs,224 and also for
223. Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—Latcrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1631–32 (1997). Espinoza
challenges scholars and advocate to tell and retell stories with new voices, rhythms, and
characterizations, posting that, through such stories, the legal community can begin to defy
the dominant racial paradigm. She explains that “[with] each telling and retelling, both
listener and speaker are better able to construct a meaning for their own individual life
and to sort through false visions of our individual stories and of the cultural stories that
constrain us.” Id. at 1632.
224. The Fair Housing Act, for example, explicitly recognizes that persons aggrieved
by the perpetrator’s discrimination may be awarded relief, including actual damages,
injunctive, or other equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (2012). Section 3612(g)(3)
arises under an administrative law forum in which the aggrieved person is seeking relief.
Section 3612(o) applies that same remedy analysis to actions brought on behalf of the
United States under § 3612(a). Id. § 3612(o); see also id. § 3613(c) (in a civil action brought
directly in state or federal court under the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff may be awarded
“actual and punitive damages”); id. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (court may award monetary damages
to aggrieved person harmed by pattern or practice of discrimination established in an
action brought under the Fair Housing Act pursuant to § 3614). The Fair Housing Act
defines “aggrieved person” as “any person who—(1) claims to have been injured by a
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the embarrassment, humiliation, and shame experienced due to the
defendant’s discriminatory conduct.225 In Broome v. Biondi,226 a case
of race discrimination in housing, for example, plaintiff Shannon
Broome testified she felt “embarrassed” and “humiliated” by the
approval process and the denial of her application to sublet an
apartment227 and plaintiff Gregory Broome testified that he felt
“angry” and “demoralized” by the hostile manner in which he was
treated, including his submission to an “interrogation” by the co-op
board.228 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $230,000 in compensatory
damages, primarily for emotional distress, and $410,000 in punitive
damages.229 Upholding the damages awards, the Broome court
catalogued emotional distress damages in similar discrimination cases
and determined that, in assessing emotional distress damages, courts
“must rely primarily on case-specific facts relating to the severity of
the discriminatory behavior and duration of the resulting emotional
damage.”230 The court also recognized that “the genuine emotional
pain associated with such discrimination should not be devalued by
unreasonably low compensatory damage awards, especially when one
discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” Id. § 3602(i). Analog state statutes
similarly permit damages awards to individual victims of housing discrimination. See, e.g.,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41A-7 (2015). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, extended the protections of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include the right to sue for compensatory and
punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, sec. 102, §1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b)(2012)).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming
damages award to fair housing “testers,” who experienced upset, humiliation,
embarrassment, and shame when they discovered, after their interaction with defendants,
that they had been treated less favorably because of their race); Littlefield v. McGuffey,
954 F.2d 1337, 1348–49 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming a jury award of $50,000 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages based on a finding that defendant rejected Ms.
Littlefield as a tenant because of her boyfriend’s and daughter’s races, crediting plaintiff’s
testimony about the negative effect of racially-animated death threats); Sec’y, U.S. Dept.
of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872–73 (11th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a jury award for actual economic losses and emotional distress, for plaintiffs
unable to purchase a home because of their race, recognizing the relationship between the
“humiliation and embarrassment” plaintiffs suffered and the compensatory damages
award); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing the district
court’s finding of no liability or damages when defendant landlord conditioned plaintiffs’
tenancy on an agreement to no longer accept Black guests and directing the lower court to
“award plaintiffs an amount which will fairly compensate them for [their] emotional
distress,” including “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered”).
226. 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
227. Id. at 223–28 (citing Transcript at 190–91).
228. Id. (citing Transcript at 89–90, 92–93, 177, 168, 189–90).
229. Id. at 223–28.
230. Id. at 225.
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considers the difficulty a plaintiff faces in establishing that he or she
was a victim of housing discrimination.”231 Courts around the country
have similarly acknowledged the individual nature of emotional
distress and compensatory damages for discrimination, as well as the
necessity of sufficient compensatory awards.232
The greater the distress, the greater the damages.233 The
individual experiences of humiliation, shame, or degradation should
be directly proportional to the award of compensatory, or emotional
distress, damages.234 Because the civil rights statutory schemes and
related case law assess a victim’s evidence of humiliation,
degradation, and shame to award emotional distress damages, victims
of sex discrimination, based on racial subgroup, should be
compensated accordingly.235 Tametra should be compensated for the
humiliation, shame, and degradation she experienced at Travis’s
hands. Tametra may have experienced feelings of humiliation and

231. Id. at 226.
232. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26.
233. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The more
inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant’s action is, the more reasonable it is to
infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action; consequently,
somewhat more conclusory evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an
award for emotional distress.”).
234. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 151, at 21–26. This is also true in sexual
harassment cases. See, e.g., Banai v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 102 F.3d
1203, 1207 & n. 4 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “anger, embarrassment, and emotional
distress are clearly compensable injuries under th[e] [FHA],” which permits recovery of
“actual damages” including “compensation for the victim’s injuries”); Boswell v.
GumBayTay, No. 2:07-CV-135, 2009 WL 1515912, at *7 (M.D. Ala. June 1, 2009) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (2012)); Tafoya v. State Human Rights Comm., 311 P.3d 70, 79 177
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that the plaintiff “suffered emotional distress because
of David’s conduct, which embarrassed and humiliated her and made her afraid in her
own home”). It is also in keeping with traditional tort remedies, where compensatory
damages are designed to compensate a person for a legally recognized loss and courts
explain to a defendant that he must “take the plaintiff as he finds him.” DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES 210 (2d ed. 1993).
235. This Article is not advocating for a hierarchy of damages awards based on race or
any other factor. This Article focuses its attention on race-sex discrimination because race
has often been ignored in the context of sex discrimination, because racial stereotypes
have motivated and infected sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, and because
there is a history of depressed awards to Black plaintiffs. The idea of individualized storytelling, combined with a thoughtful and unique approach to damages demands, can be
applied in other contexts. If a woman in a wheelchair is sexually harassed by her landlord
and, as part of the sexual harassment, the landlord refuses to consider giving the woman a
first-floor apartment, her lawyer could apply the concepts in this Article to present an
intersectional disability-sex case through the lens of a sex discrimination claim. Further,
her lawyer may argue that her client’s experience of sexual harassment caused her to feel
shame, degradation, and emotional distress at a heightened level because of the landlord’s
abuse of her disability and that she should be duly compensated.
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shame when her supervisor made sexually explicit comments to her or
showed her a photograph of his exposed penis in his office. She may
have also experienced a sense of degradation when Travis asked her if
she had ever been with a White man, discussed the size of his penis
relative to other White men, and told her “Black women got better
pussy than white women.” Those feelings of degradation, humiliation,
and shame are wrapped up in Tametra’s individual experience of
racialized sexual harassment, her personal history, and America’s
national history of perpetuating a stereotype of Black women as
lascivious Jezebels.236
Developing individual case theories and asking for damages
commensurate with a story of complex discrimination breaks down
stereotypes and pushes back on a system that has too often measured
damages by the valuation of the recipient, grounded in race- and sexbased stereotypes.237 In criminal and civil cases, quantitative and
qualitative evidence establishes that women and minorities fare worse
than men and Whites.238 That is true even where race is not explicitly
236. See HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 138, at 53–69; Austin, supra note 79, at 570;
Roberts, supra note 143, at 11–12. Black women, of course, are not the only women
subjected to cultural myths that increase their vulnerability to harassment or subjugation.
Cf. Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis
of Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 397, 404 (2015) (“Latina immigrant workers may also experience
subjugation based upon cultural narratives that inform their experiences both at home and
at work.”).
237. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF
INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1, 2–5 (2010) (“[W]hen viewed though a wider
cultural lens, the basic structure of contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and
reinforce the social marginalization of women and racial minorities and to place a lower
value on their lives, activities, and potential.”); AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON,
DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS, WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 3, 26, 32
(1985) (studying 9,000 civil cases in Cook County, Illinois between 1960 and 1979 and
finding that Black litigants had a lower chance of success in jury trials, and that Black
plaintiffs received smaller awards than non-Black plaintiffs, averaging less than half of the
median award and only 40 percent of the average award for non-Black plaintiffs); 3 DAN
B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 479 (2d ed.
2011).
238. In rape and sexual assault cases, prosecutors, judges, and juries appear to value
the social harm resulting from the rape of a Black woman less than the social harm
resulting from the rape of a White woman. See Pokorak, supra note 136, at 38–43; cf.
Crenshaw, supra note 25 at 1269 (citing Race Tilts the Scales of Justice. Study: Dallas
Punishes Attacks on Whites More Harshly, DALL. TIMES HERALD, Aug. 19, 1990, at A1);
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race
and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997,
998 (2003) (citing DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 143 (1990) (discussing a study finding
that defendants in more than 2,000 Georgia capital murder cases were 4.3 times more
likely to receive the death penalty if the victim was White than if the victim was Black)).
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part of the case.239 Certain scholars have suggested that raceconscious discourse in the law may actually break the application of
negative racial stereotypes. In part because the evidence suggests that
race and gender stereotypes seep into the outcomes of cases
regardless of express discussion, this Part posits that such research
offers hope to plaintiffs willing to explicitly allege, argue, and demand
damages commensurate with their experience of race-sex
discrimination. By using “race-conscious talk,” rather than “raceneutral” or “race-coded”240 talk, legal actors may “exploit, and at
times . . . thwart, bias . . . .”241 Addressing race explicitly can recast
ideas about race and racial identity and might interrupt the
factfinder’s instinct to apply racial stereotypes and biases without
thinking.242 Explicitly discussing the injury of the racialization of sex
discrimination may also create a cultural bridge between the judge or
juror and the victim of race-sex discrimination.243
Advocates representing intersectional plaintiffs can take
concrete steps to tell the client’s story of racialized sex discrimination
in court and to ask for damages commensurate with her story. For
example, in investigating a case like Tametra’s, the lawyer could ask
her client questions about how her race was a part of her sexual
Similar results accrue in studies of sentencing disparities. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra
note 238, at 1006 (citing Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of
Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1982)).There
are similar accounts in civil tort cases. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 237, at
2–5.
239. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 237, at 33; CHIN & PETERSON, supra
note 237, at 3, 26, 32.
240. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1137
(2014) (defining race-conscious talk as discourse that “discerns extant racial consciousness
in law and in the social and political construction of color among individuals, groups, and
communities”).
241. Id. (looking specifically at criminal law trials).
242. See id. at 1157 (“The integration of race-conscious reasoning into civil rights . . .
advocacy . . . requires confronting and naming race in the lawyering and criminal justice
process, and recasting racial identity . . . .”); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort
Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 797 (1996) (“[T]alking
about race can defeat rather than promote racism.”).
243. See Victor M. Goode & Conrad A. Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing
Discrimination Cases: A New Look at a Lingering Problem, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1143,
1174–75 (2003) (relying on psychological studies that suggest that Whites are driven by
cultural biases, known and unknown to them, Goode and Johnson come to several
conclusions, including that “even reluctant whites can be brought around to non-racist
behavior through an institutional approach that vigorously and actively promotes those
values and carefully monitors transgressions”); cf. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note
114, at 602–03 (relying on Marc Fajer’s proposal to “‘re-tell’ personal narratives of gay and
lesbian people in order to ‘counter and demonstrate’ homophobic stereotypes” and “offer
‘new perspectives’ into legal discourse”).
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harassment and how she felt about all parts of her experience with
her supervisor. Her lawyer could draft a complaint that includes
factual allegations representative of her client’s experience and injury,
not just the facts sufficient to make out a pure sex discrimination
claim. She could ask about her client’s emotions on the stand and
consider putting on an expert witness to discuss the history of racial
stereotyping around sex and sexuality and its emotional toll on
individuals and communities. In drafting the jury instructions on
damages, her lawyer could use the case law on individual damages to
step outside of model jury instructions. And in closing argument, her
lawyer might pull the case theory together for the jury, explaining
why her client’s injury based on the sexual assault cannot be
separated from the racial animus embedded in the assault.
C.

Agencies: The Form as a Starting, not Ending Point

Finally, agencies have a role in adequately understanding and
analyzing claims and charges of complex discrimination. Tametra
Moore’s experience with the EEOC is representative and instructive.
As required, she filed an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC.244
Unrepresented by counsel, Tametra provided her personal
information, checking the “African-American” race box.245 In
responding to the question about the basis for her discrimination, she
checked the boxes for “sexual harassment” and “harassment.”246
Although Tametra included fourteen handwritten pages detailing her
experience of discrimination, calling attention to aspects of racial
harassment and sexual harassment, Tametra did not check the “race
discrimination” box.247 The EEOC issued Tametra a notice-to-sue
letter charging sexual harassment and retaliation.248 Based on
Tametra’s decision not to check the “race discrimination” box on her
EEOC Intake Questionnaire, the defendant sought summary
judgment on her Title VII race discrimination claim.249 The defendant
argued that Tametra failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, a
requirement to proceed under Title VII.250 Citing a string of
244. Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire, supra note 10. The EEOC form has changed
marginally since 2009, when Ms. Moore filled out her questionnaire. For the current form,
see U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 83.
245. Moore EEOC Intake Questionnaire, supra note 10, at 3.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Moore Compl., supra note 1, at 2.
249. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–14, Moore v. Cricket
Communications, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-03310 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010), ECF No. 14.
250. Id.
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analogous cases, the defendant argued that “[a] Title VII claim may
only be based on the specific complaints in the Charge submitted to
the EEOC,” with the exception of “claims that are ‘like or related to
the [C]harge’s allegations,’ limited by the ‘scope of the EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
[C]harge of Discrimination.”251 The defendant explained:
Plaintiff did not include a claim of race discrimination on her
EEOC Intake Questionnaire, checking only the boxes for sex
discrimination and retaliation. Consistent with Plaintiff’s
limited allegations of sex discrimination and retaliation, the
Notice of Charge of Discrimination to Cricket states the issues
of the Charge are Harassment and Sexual Harassment and does
not discuss any race discrimination claim or mention the word
‘race.’ Under such circumstances, Plaintiff’s race discrimination
claim is not related to her sex harassment claim or retaliation
claim and was not within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation
of Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to her race discrimination claim.
Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the
claim and it must be dismissed as a matter of law.252
The Moore court denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.253 The court found that Tametra was not limited to the
types of discrimination expressly checked in her Intake
Questionnaire.254 The Moore court explicitly recognized that the
procedure set forth in Title VII was “not designed for the
sophisticated or the cognoscenti, but to protect equality of
opportunity among all employees and prospective employees.”255
Although the Moore court ultimately recognized the claim of
race discrimination in Tametra’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire,256
courts do not uniformly excuse discrepancies between the
administrative forms and claims of discrimination.257 Further, the
251. Id. at 13 (citing DeJesus-Harris v. Blockbuster Video, No. SA-04-CA-1099-XR,
2006 WL 262051, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2006)).
252. Id. at 14.
253. Moore v. Cricket Commc’ns, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 853 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
254. Id. at 859.
255. Id. at 860 (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 463 (5th
Cir.1970)).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491–92 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming
dismissal of retaliation claim where the plaintiff “did not check the retaliation box on her
charge form, and the narrative explaining her charge made no mention of retaliation”);
Luna v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 54 F. App’x 404, 2002 WL 31687698, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct.
22, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (stating that because plaintiff “failed
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summary judgment briefing underscores the problem with the
procedure at its origination—the administrative agency. Defendants
are relying on the administrative exhaustion requirement, which is
rigidly formulaic, to escape otherwise meritorious discrimination
actions. The most obvious solution would be to eliminate the
exhaustion requirement in Title VII to mirror the administrative
process in the Fair Housing Act.258 In the absence of a legislative
change, there is another simple solution. The form should eliminate
the check boxes with respect to the reason or basis for the
complainant’s claim of discrimination. And complaints should be
further encouraged to describe their evidence of discrimination in a
narrative. Taken together with the personal demographic information
already sought on the form, the agency will be tasked with
investigating and charging the discrimination. Because the
investigators presumably have more familiarity with the law of
employment or housing discrimination, they will be better situated
than pro se complainants to assess the bases on which a discrimination
action might be pursued.259 Then, the complainant can decide upon
which basis or bases to proceed.
The proposed solution is a simple change to the form. It is in
keeping with the statutory scheme, which contemplates that EEOC
and HUD investigators will consider, at a substantive level, the
to mark the box indicating his intention to bring a claim of national origin
discrimination. . . . [He] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim”);
Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff could not proceed with a race discrimination claim because her EEOC Charge of
Discrimination was limited to sex discrimination); Cohens v. Md. Dep’t of Human Res.,
933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (D. Md. 2013) (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff
“neither checked the ‘retaliation’ box on her EEOC charge nor alleged retaliation in the
charge’s factual summary”).
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2012) (providing for an administrative resolution but not
requiring administrative exhaustion prior to filing a private action in state or federal
court).
259. While this might cause some additional burden on the government, it is the kind
of burden and expense that is contemplated in the statutory scheme. The HUD Fair
Housing Enforcement Office manual, for example, states: “The investigation of a
complaint filed under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 . . . consists of gathering
and analyzing facts regarding a complainant’s allegations and the respondent’s defenses
with respect to the alleged discriminatory housing practice or policy to determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent violated the Fair Housing Act.”
TITLE VIII COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION, AND CONCILIATION HANDBOOK
(8024.1), Ch. 7, https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/80241C7FHEH.PDF [https://perma.cc
/CA8N-W9VB]. But see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EVALUATION OF FHEO
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROCESSING AND COMPLIANCE (2008),
https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IED-07-001.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/9XMA-9QXW] (identifying problems with HUD’s fair housing investigations pursuant to
complaints filed).
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complainant’s allegations.260 It does not prejudice the potential
defendant or defendants because they are on notice of the alleged
events and can foresee the potential claims that arise from the
allegations. It is also in keeping with the traditional requirements of
the federal rules261 and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
pleading.262
In addition to, and certainly in the absence of, implementing the
revised form, the agencies should provide additional information to
complainants about the relationship between the standard intake
forms, the charge of discrimination, and any resulting federal claims.
That information is currently absent.
CONCLUSION
Rights-based antidiscrimination law has failed to achieve
equality on many fronts. One front is the failure to integrate the
insights of intersectionality theory in any meaningful way. But rightsbased antidiscrimination law remains the primary tool for fighting
discrimination in the workplace, housing, the classroom, the bank,
and hotels across this country. It is with that understanding that this
Article considers how to use the current antidiscrimination scheme to
best address and remedy intersectional discrimination. With our
consciousness raised by the insights and critiques of intersectionality
theory, the door is now open to a new perspective for understanding
and addressing intersectionality and intersectional discrimination
within the traditional confines of antidiscrimination law. The cluster
framework—by refining the vision of intersectional discrimination,
relocating intersectional discrimination within that vision, defining
discrimination in a way that accounts for the categorization,
stereotyping, and subjugation of subgroups of protected classes, and
understanding the injuries of complex discrimination—acts as a
roadmap for people of all colors to take up the cause of fighting
intersectional discrimination.

260. § 2000e-5 (requiring investigation for Title VII charges); id. § 3610 (requiring
investigation of a Fair Housing Act complaint).
261. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
262. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a complaint must
plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
545 (2007) (holding that notice pleading does require enough factual allegations to “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true”).

